Bravo, Alexandro Jordan
PD-1050-15
Tex. App.—WacoAug 17, 2015Background
- On Jan. 5, 2012 a multi-vehicle pursuit ended when a Durango driven by Steven Rangel (with three young children aboard) was rammed, lost control, and struck a light pole; Rangel and his children (including three-year-old A.D.) suffered serious injuries. Appellant Alexandro Bravo was one of the pursuers/drivers and fled the scene.
- Bravo was indicted and tried for first-degree injury to a child (Tex. Penal Code § 22.04), charged as having intentionally or knowingly caused A.D.’s serious bodily injury.
- The State relied on the law of parties and the doctrine of transferred intent (Tex. Penal Code § 6.04) to link Bravo’s intent to injure Rangel to the injury suffered by A.D. when the same collision injured both the intended victim and the bystander child.
- At trial the jury was instructed on intentional/knowing liability, criminal-negligence as a lesser included offense, the law of parties, conspiracy, and a transferred-intent instruction; Bravo objected to the transferred-intent instruction and other matters.
- The First Court of Appeals affirmed Bravo’s conviction and rejected his challenges that (1) transferred intent cannot be used to convert an intent to injure one person into culpability for injury to another when both were injured in the same single criminal act, and (2) there was insufficient evidence that Bravo or co-defendants "knowingly" caused A.D.’s injury given no evidence they knew a child was present.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Bravo) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 6.04(b)(2) (transferred intent) can supply intent for injury-to-a-child when the intended victim and the bystander were both injured in the same single instance of conduct | Transferred intent may be applied to injure-to-a-child prosecutions; the law permits transferring culpability when the result (injury to a different person) occurs | Transferred intent cannot be used to multiply a single intent to support culpability for two victims from one criminal act; Roberts limits such use where one intent would be stretched to support multiple greater-offense convictions | Court of Appeals: Transferred intent validly applied here (affirmed conviction); PDR argues this ruling conflicts with Roberts and should be reviewed |
| Whether evidence supports a finding that Bravo acted "knowingly" as to A.D.’s injury when there was no evidence defendants knew a child was in the Durango | Bravo’s conduct (prolonged high-speed chase, ramming, blocking lanes, fleeing without aid) made injury to others reasonably certain; knowledge that a specific victim was a child isn’t required | Without proof defendants knew a child was present, they could not have been "aware" that their conduct was reasonably certain to cause the specific result to A.D. (§ 6.03(b)) | Court of Appeals: Evidence sufficient to show Bravo was aware his conduct was reasonably certain to cause serious injury to others and thus satisfied the knowing mental state for A.D.’s injury (affirmed) |
| Whether the transferred-intent jury instruction and its application paragraph (which referenced criminal negligence) misstated law and harmed appellant | Transferred-intent instruction and application were proper; charge also separately instructed on criminal negligence as a lesser offense | Application paragraph improperly mixed culpable mental states and thereby could have permitted conviction based on criminal negligence rather than intentional/knowing conduct | Court of Appeals: Any inclusion of "criminal negligence" in the transferred-intent application was not harmful in context; charge as a whole was correct (no reversible error) |
| Whether prosecutor’s voir dire hypotheticals on the law of parties were improper commitment questions | Hypotheticals explained law of parties and tested venire bias; proper to use to elicit whether jurors could apply the law | Questions were improper commitment questions that asked jurors to commit to outcomes before evidence | Court of Appeals: Hypotheticals were proper commitment questions (fit Standefer test), did not abuse discretion (affirmed) |
Key Cases Cited
- Roberts v. State, 273 S.W.3d 322 (Tex. Crim. App.) (limits use of transferred intent to support multiple intentional killings from a single act in capital-murder context)
- Ex parte Norris, 390 S.W.3d 338 (Tex. Crim. App.) (clarifies Roberts; transferred intent may apply when separate intents or sufficiently separate conduct exist)
- Thompson v. State, 236 S.W.3d 787 (Tex. Crim. App.) (applies transferred intent to injury-to-a-child; explains capital-murder statute is distinctive re: transfer)
- Zubia v. State, 998 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. Crim. App.) (holds State need not prove defendant knew victim’s age to convict under injury-to-a-child statute)
- Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. Crim. App.) (explains injury-to-a-child is result-oriented; mental state relates to result)