Branton, K. v. Nicholas Meat, LLC
159 A.3d 540
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2017Background
- Nicholas Meat operated a slaughterhouse producing food processing waste (FPW); FPW was transported to and spread on Bowes and Camerer Farms and later stored in a 2.4 million gallon tank on Bowes Farm. JAB transported FPW.
- DEP issued multiple Notices of Violation (NOVs) to Nicholas, Bowes Farm, and Camerer Farm between 2011–2013 following complaints, but DEP repeatedly inspected and on several occasions found no violations or took no enforcement beyond the NOVs.
- Appellants sued (filed June 14, 2013) alleging negligence and private nuisance from FPW spreading and storage; negligence claims were later withdrawn. Plaintiffs sought relief for odors and interference with use/enjoyment of their property.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing the Right to Farm Act (RTFA), 3 P.S. § 954(a) (one‑year statute of repose), barred nuisance claims because defendants had lawfully operated and FPW spreading/storage were normal agricultural operations.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants. On appeal, the Superior Court reviewed statutory interpretation de novo and addressed (1) meaning of “lawfully been in operation,” (2) whether FPW spreading/storage are “normal agricultural operations,” and (3) whether the Bowes storage tank was a substantial change.
- Holding: RTFA bars claims arising from spreading FPW (defendants met the three RTFA requirements for that activity), but the 2.4M gallon storage tank was a substantial physical change that became operational less than one year before suit, so claims tied to storage survive; judgment affirmed in part, vacated in part, remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether RTFA’s phrase “has lawfully been in operation for one year” requires strict compliance with all laws or only substantial compliance | "Lawfully" requires no violations during the relevant year; NOVs show operations were unlawful so RTFA doesn’t bar suit | "Lawfully" means substantial compliance with applicable laws; minor/technical citations do not defeat RTFA protection | Court: "lawfully" means substantial compliance; technical or isolated NOVs do not automatically defeat RTFA protection; defendants satisfied this for spreading claims |
| Whether spreading and storage of FPW are "normal agricultural operations" under RTFA | FPW spreading/storage are unlawful in practice and thus not "normal" | FPW spreading and storage are established agricultural practices (long history, DEP regulations and guidance); thus "normal" | Court: spreading FPW and storage constitute normal agricultural operations under RTFA |
| Whether the construction/operation of the 2.4M gallon storage tank was a "substantial change" resetting RTFA’s one‑year repose | Tank construction in April 2012 (or at least became operational July 2012) was a major expansion, so RTFA does not bar storage‑related claims filed within one year | If tank became operational >1 year before suit then RTFA still bars claims; alternatively tank was covered by nutrient management plan | Court: tank construction was a substantial expansion; evidence showed it became operational no earlier than July 2012 (<1 year before suit); nutrient management plans did not address that tank; storage claims not barred |
| Whether the trial court could decide RTFA applicability on summary judgment | Plaintiffs: factual disputes (e.g., lawfulness, normality, substantial change) preclude summary judgment | Defendants: applicability involves statutory interpretation and application of undisputed facts; question of law appropriate for summary judgment | Court: RTFA applicability here raised legal/statutory questions applying definitions to undisputed facts; summary judgment appropriate for spreading and storage‑scope questions; storage timing factual record required denial of repose for storage claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Gilbert v. Synagro Cent., LLC, 131 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2015) (RTFA’s statute of repose scope and the court’s role in determining "normal agricultural operation")
- Graver v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 96 A.3d 383 (Pa. Super. 2014) (distinction between statutes of repose and limitations)
- CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (U.S. 2014) (clarified the effect of statutes of repose as substantive bars)
- Home v. Haladay, 728 A.2d 954 (Pa. Super. 1999) (substantial compliance and agency findings relevant to RTFA protections)
- Walck v. Lower Towamensing Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 942 A.2d 200 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (Commonwealth Court view that storage of FPW may not be "normal" under zoning analysis; treated as persuasive but distinguishable)