143 So. 3d 1070
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2014Background
- Appellant Jason Branson appealed a final injunction for protection against domestic violence entered for appellee Koren Rodriguez-Linares based on alleged cyberstalking.
- Trial court found Branson did not threaten Rodriguez-Linares but had stalked her by sending about 300 emails in ~1.5 months.
- Branson did not challenge the factual finding of stalking; he argued the injunction was improper because there were no threats or physical violence.
- The statutory question centered on whether "stalking" qualifies as "domestic violence" under Fla. Stat. § 741.28(2) for purpose of a § 741.30(1)(a) injunction.
- Court examined the stalking statute (§ 784.048) and the domestic violence definition to decide if stalking, including cyberstalking, can be a qualifying act of domestic violence without physical injury or threats.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether recent stalking (cyberstalking) qualifies as "domestic violence" under § 741.28(2) | Rodriguez-Linares: stalking is listed in statute and thus is an act of domestic violence supporting injunction | Branson: because there was no threat or physical injury, stalking cannot support a domestic violence injunction | Held: Stalking (including cyberstalking) is an enumerated offense in § 741.28(2) and can qualify as domestic violence without physical injury or an explicit threat; injunction affirmed |
| Whether petitioner must also prove imminent danger of future physical violence when stalking is proven | Rodriguez-Linares: not necessary when petitioner proves she was the victim of a qualifying offense (stalking) | Branson: without threat or violence, petitioner only showed harassment and must show imminent danger to obtain injunction | Held: If recent stalking is sufficiently established and parties are family/household members, petitioner need not show imminent danger of future violence |
Key Cases Cited
- Young v. Smith, 901 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (telephone harassment insufficient where stalking elements not shown)
- Giallanza v. Giallanza, 787 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (general harassment insufficient to extend injunction; statutory definition requires some showing of violence or threat)
- Randolph v. Rich, 58 So. 3d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (isolated uncivil conduct insufficient to support injunction)
- Gustafson v. Mauck, 743 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (apparently innocuous phone calls did not establish stalking for injunction)
- Stone v. Stone, 128 So. 3d 239 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (reversed injunction where evidence of texts/calls did not support stalking; petitioner did not argue stalking theory)
- Young v. Young, 96 So. 3d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (acts alleged did not amount to cyberstalking under statutory definition)
- Brown v. State, 21 So. 3d 108 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (discussed narrower definition of domestic violence for sentencing multiplier)