Brandon Thourtman v. Daniel Junior, etc., 338 So.3d 207

Article I, §14, Fla. Const., generally guarantees pretrial release but excepts capital or life‑eligible cases when the “proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great.”
Brandon Thourtman was arrested for armed robbery (life‑eligible). At first appearance the court reviewed the arrest affidavit, found probable cause, and announced “no bond,” deferring a bail ruling pending an Arthur hearing.
Thourtman requested an Arthur hearing days later; at that hearing the court found the State met the “proof evident, presumption great” standard as to robbery but not as to use of a firearm, so it granted release on conditions and bail.
The Third DCA (Thourtman v. Junior) held that, upon a finding of probable cause at first appearance, a trial court may defer ruling on pretrial release and detain the defendant for a reasonable time to conduct a full Arthur hearing without making a preliminary finding that the proof is evident or the presumption great, and certified conflict with Fourth DCA decisions (Gray, Ysaza).
The Florida Supreme Court approved the Third DCA, disapproved Gray and Ysaza, and held the Constitution does not require a preliminary “proof evident, presumption great” finding at first appearance before detaining a life‑eligible or capital defendant for a reasonable time to hold a full Arthur hearing.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Thourtman)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether art. I, §14 forbids detaining a capital/life‑eligible defendant beyond first appearance unless the court first finds the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great.	The Constitution requires a preliminary finding at first appearance; absent that finding the right to pretrial release is lost.	A court that finds probable cause may defer a final bail ruling and detain the defendant for a reasonable time to hold a full Arthur hearing; a preliminary finding is not constitutionally required.	The Court held art. I, §14 does not require a preliminary “proof evident, presumption great” finding at first appearance; reasonable detention pending a full Arthur hearing is permitted.
Whether the language in State v. Arthur that "before release on bail pending trial can ever be denied, the State must come forward with a showing that the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great" requires that timing (i.e., at first appearance).	Arthur mandates the finding before bail can be denied — thus at first appearance.	The Arthur language addressed who bears the burden of proof and the sufficiency of the State’s showing, not the timing; that statement is dicta on timing.	The Court agreed Arthur’s quoted language was addressing the burden allocation and is not a timing requirement; it does not compel a first‑appearance determination.

State v. Arthur, 390 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1980) (established "proof evident, presumption great" standard and allocation of burden at a bail denial hearing).
Thourtman v. Junior, 275 So. 3d 726 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (held trial court may defer bail ruling after probable cause to allow reasonable time for full Arthur hearing).
Gray v. State, 257 So. 3d 477 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (interpreted Arthur to require preliminary finding at first appearance; disapproved).
Ysaza v. State, 222 So. 3d 3 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (same interpretation as Gray; disapproved).
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (U.S. 1979) (pretrial detention does not automatically implicate presumption of innocence for confinement decisions).
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (U.S. 1987) (government may detain pretrial where regulatory interest in community safety outweighs liberty interest).
State ex rel. Van Eeghen v. Williams, 87 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1956) (noting the "proof evident or presumption great" standard is higher than beyond a reasonable doubt).
Russell v. State, 71 So. 27 (Fla. 1916) (early articulation that "proof evident or presumption great" is a high evidentiary standard).