Brandon Taylor v. Medtronic, Inc., 15f4th148

Brandon Taylor sued five Medtronic/Covidien entities in New York state court for injuries from an allegedly defective hernia mesh, asserting product-liability and warranty claims.
Four defendants filed a notice of removal to federal court within the 30-day statutory window; Covidien LP did not join that notice because it (and counsel) mistakenly believed it had not been served.
Taylor moved to remand, arguing Covidien LP had in fact been properly served and thus unanimous consent to removal was lacking.
Covidien LP later joined the other defendants in opposing remand, but that opposition was filed 17 days after the 30-day removal period had expired.
The district court found Covidien LP’s opposition cured the unanimity defect, denied remand, and dismissed Taylor’s complaint; the Second Circuit reversed, holding late consent cannot cure a timely-consent defect and vacated the dismissal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a properly served defendant can cure failure to timely consent to removal by later opposing remand after the 30-day window	Taylor: Covidien LP was properly served, so removal without its timely consent was invalid and case must be remanded	Defendants: Covidien LP’s omission was a technical/mistaken oversight; its later opposition to remand constitutes consent and cures the defect	Held: No. A properly served defendant cannot cure failure to consent by untimely opposition; removal was improper and remand is required
Whether courts may create a judge-made exception to the statutory unanimity/timing requirement after Congress codified the rule	Taylor: Statute’s mandatory timing and unanimity leave no room for judicial exceptions	Defendants: Prior case law permits curing such defects by later action; opposing remand should suffice	Held: Court may not create exceptions to the statute’s clear mandatory command; judge-made exceptions are foreclosed by the 2011 codification

Pietrangelo v. Alvas Corp., 686 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (defendants must independently express consent to removal)
Lupo v. Human Affairs Int’l, Inc., 28 F.3d 269 (2d Cir. 1994) (removal rights are statutory and must strictly conform to requirements)
Christiansen v. West Branch Cmty. Sch. Dist., 674 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding limited to facts where late filings occurred within removal period)
Esposito v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 590 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2009) (late joining by opposition may cure defect where actions occurred within removal window and extensive federal litigation followed)
Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (U.S. 2016) (statutory mandatory language leaves no room for judge-made exceptions)
Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cnty., 493 U.S. 20 (U.S. 1989) (courts may not create exceptions where Congress omitted them)