Brandon Stachulski v. Apple New England, LLC
191 A.3d 1231
N.H.2018Background
- Plaintiff Brandon Stachulski sued Apple New England, LLC (Applebee’s) under strict products liability after developing non-typhoidal salmonella following a February 2014 restaurant meal; jury awarded $750,000.
- Defendant disputed the hamburger as the source, pointing to plaintiff’s pet lizard and other possible exposures.
- Plaintiff’s causation proof relied on medical records, his and relatives’ testimony, and expert infectious-disease testimony from Dr. Seth D. Rosenbaum (differential etiology).
- Defendant moved in limine to exclude testimony about belated lizard testing and to exclude Rosenbaum’s expert testimony; both motions were denied.
- Trial evidence included plaintiff’s symptoms/timing within salmonella incubation period, brother‑in‑law’s similar illness after same meal, voluminous medical records describing ongoing post‑infectious GI problems, and expert testimony that up to one‑third of salmonella cases have prolonged complaints.
- Trial court denied defendant’s post‑verdict motions (JNOV, directed verdict on various damage categories, and remittitur); on appeal the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admission of allegedly prejudicial testimony (e.g., belated lizard testing) | Testimony was admissible and part of factual record for jury to weigh | Trial court should have excluded as unfairly prejudicial | Appeal failed for lack of record showing trial court error; denial stands |
| Admissibility of Rosenbaum’s expert testimony | Rosenbaum used differential etiology and sufficient facts; methodology reliable | Opinion lacked sufficient facts/methods and thus was unreliable under RSA 516:29‑a/Daubert principles | Trial court did not unsustainably exercise discretion; Rosenbaum admissible |
| Causation (hamburger caused salmonella) | Timing, brother‑in‑law’s symptoms, medical records, and expert opinion made causation more likely than not | Alternative sources (lizard, home food) made causation speculative; JNOV warranted | Sufficient conflicting evidence for jury; denial of JNOV upheld |
| Future pain and suffering (necessity of expert proof) | Medical records, plaintiff testimony, and Rosenbaum’s opinion sufficiently showed likely future symptoms | Expert evidence was required to submit future damages to jury | Court held evidence sufficient; jury could reasonably award future pain and suffering |
| Hedonic damages (permanency requirement) | Hedonic damages available for plaintiff’s loss of enjoyment even if temporary | Hedonic damages require proof of permanent impairment | Court held hedonic damages need not be limited to permanent impairment; submission to jury proper |
| Counsel’s opening/closing statements (plain error) | Statements were fair inferences from evidence | Statements were improper appeals to emotion; trial court should have struck them sua sponte | No plain error: statements drew from admitted evidence; no new trial required |
| Remittitur (excessiveness of $750,000 award) | Verdict supported by evidence of lifestyle limitations, ongoing care, and hedonic loss | Award was manifestly exorbitant given ~$43,000 medical bills | Trial court did not abuse discretion in denying remittitur; award not manifestly exorbitant |
Key Cases Cited
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (U.S. 1993) (trial court gatekeeper for expert reliability)
- Osman v. Lin, 169 N.H. 329 (N.H. 2016) (applying RSA 516:29‑a/Daubert framework; standard of review for expert admissibility)
- Goudreault v. Kleeman, 158 N.H. 236 (N.H. 2009) (differential etiology recognized as reliable methodology)
- Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 1999) (describing differential etiology approach)
- Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813 (N.H. 2005) (strict products liability proximate cause standard; remittitur review)
- Bennett v. Lembo, 145 N.H. 276 (N.H. 2000) (discussion of hedonic damages and their purpose)
- Reed v. County of Hillsborough, 148 N.H. 590 (N.H. 2002) (when lay testimony suffices vs. need for expert to avoid speculation)
