Brandon Mobley v. State of Tennessee, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 200

Mobley was 16 when he killed Joshua Nance and Oshalique Hoffman, after tensions over drug debts and a threat to his life; he used a pistol at close range and disposed of Nance's body after driving Hoffman's car and setting it on fire.
A six-shot revolver found at the scene contained Mobley's fingerprint and Hoffman's blood; later, Hoffman's car was burned on a gravel road; Mobley admitted killings to associates, with inconsistent accounts.
Mobley was charged with two counts each of premeditated and felony first-degree murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of setting fire to personal property; prosecutors sought life without parole.
Trial defense argued self-defense and lack of premeditation; Dr. Pamela Auble, a defense psychologist, testified after the State initially objected, opining Mobley had mental illness that affected capacity to premeditate; the court limited her testimony to not address ultimate capacity to premeditate.
Mobley was convicted on all counts; the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the murder convictions but reduced the robbery/arson sentences; post-conviction relief petitions followed, raising numerous ineffective-assistance and trial-court error claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to elicit Dr. Auble’s ultimate-issue opinion	Mobley contends counsel should have asked whether Mobley lacked the capacity to premeditate.	Mobley argues counsel’s performance fell below objective standards and prejudiced the outcome.	No relief; counsel deficient but no reasonable probability of different outcome.
Whether failure to object to or properly address the stun belt amounted to ineffective assistance	Mobley asserts counsel failed to challenge or adequately pursue the stun belt issue.	State contends trial strategy and record support credibility of the restraint choice.	Remand for further proceedings to assess stun belt use and potential prejudice.
Whether Momon-like procedures were required when Mobley testified	Mobley asserts Momon protections were applicable to his decision to testify.	Court should not extend Momon protections to defendants who choose to testify.	Waived; no Momon hearing required for a defendant who elects to testify.
Whether adversarial relationship with counsel deprived Mobley of effective assistance	Mobley claims persistent conflict impeded his defense.	Counsel and court found communications adequate and no irreconcilable conflict.	No reversible prejudice; no ultimate finding of ineffective assistance based on relationship.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (establishes deficient performance and prejudice standard for ineffective assistance)
Pylant v. State, 263 S.W.3d 854 (Tenn. 2008) (clear-and-convincing evidence; mixed questions of law and fact in post-conviction)
Calvert v. State, 342 S.W.3d 477 (Tenn. 2011) (definitive standard for reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel)
Vaughn v. State, 202 S.W.3d 106 (Tenn. 2006) (reaffirmed Strickland prejudice framework in Tennessee post-conviction)
Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363 (Tenn. 1996) (highly deferential standard; avoid 20-20 hindsight in evaluating performance)
State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679 (Tenn. 1997) (permits expert testimony on mental state affecting capacity to form culpable intent)
Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (U.S. 2005) (physical restraints can implicate due process and require consideration of necessity and visibility)
Willocks v. State, 546 S.W.2d 819 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976) (presumption against in-court restraints; necessity and least-restrictive means)
Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 1999) (requires colloquy to ensure voluntary, knowing waiver of right to testify)