Brandon Lee Bradley v. State of Florida
214 So. 3d 648
Fla.2017Background
- On March 6, 2012, Brandon Lee Bradley was observed loading motel property into his SUV; motel employees confronted him and he left the parking lot striking a maintenance employee who was not injured.
- Deputy Barbara Pill located Bradley’s vehicle, initiated a traffic stop, and recorded the encounter on her dash camera; Bradley refused orders to exit, then fired eight shots through the partially open driver’s door at close range, fatally wounding Deputy Pill, and fled.
- Bradley and his codefendant Andria Kerchner were pursued; Bradley’s vehicle was stopped after police deployed stop sticks, and both were arrested. Ballistics matched the handgun recovered from Bradley’s vehicle to the bullets recovered from Deputy Pill and the scene.
- Bradley was convicted by a jury of first-degree premeditated murder, robbery, aggravated fleeing/eluding, and resisting arrest with violence; the penalty-phase jury recommended death by a 10–2 vote.
- The trial court found five statutory aggravators (including prior violent felony, commission during a robbery, avoidance of arrest, CCP, and being under supervision) and multiple mitigators; death sentence was imposed. Bradley appealed, raising guilt-phase and penalty-phase claims, including that Hurst v. Florida requires a new penalty proceeding.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Bradley) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Voir dire limits on asking jurors about specific aggravators | Judge improperly barred asking individual jurors whether they could still consider mitigation knowing specific aggravators (e.g., prior violent felony, officer victim) | Questions on related biases were permitted generally; limits were within discretion | Limiting those specific questions was harmless error; no reversal |
| Reference to probation officer as “high risk specialist” | Comment implied Bradley was a "high risk" probationer and prejudiced jury, requiring mistrial | Single reference was not highly prejudicial given overwhelming evidence | Denial of mistrial affirmed; comment not sufficiently prejudicial |
| State’s impeachment of its own witness (Amanda Ozburn) | Prosecutor called witness to introduce an inadmissible prior inconsistent statement—improper and prejudicial | Even if improper, error was harmless as to guilt phase given overwhelming evidence | Any error assumed but harmless beyond reasonable doubt as to guilt; penalty-phase effect not decided here due to Hurst-based remand |
| Validity of death sentence under Hurst | Florida scheme unconstitutional because jury did not make unanimous factual findings required for death | State defends existing sentencing procedure and trial court findings | Hurst requires unanimous jury findings on aggravators and weighing; nonunanimous recommendation (10–2) requires new penalty-phase jury under Hurst; remand for new penalty phase |
Key Cases Cited
- Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (U.S. 2016) (U.S. Supreme Court holding Florida’s sentencing scheme unconstitutional for failing to require jury factual findings necessary for death)
- Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016) (Florida Supreme Court applying Hurst and requiring unanimous jury findings on aggravators, sufficiency, and outweighing)
- Morton v. State, 689 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1997) (limitations on calling a witness primarily to introduce otherwise inadmissible impeachment evidence)
- Gore v. State, 475 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1985) (harmless error framework for voir dire limitations)