Brandon Andrews v. United States
125 A.3d 316
D.C.2015Background
- Andrews dated Katina Bigelow; Katina lived with her father Lacey and brother Leonard. Relationship deteriorated; Andrews sent menacing texts and was accused of threatening Katina and her family.
- Three days before the shooting Leonard allegedly threatened Andrews with a knife; Andrews left. A stay-away order was sought but not served.
- On August 26 Katina dropped Andrews’ belongings at a bus stop; Andrews sent a series of angry texts demanding compensation, later calling and announcing he would come to the Bigelow house. Leonard told Andrews he would be waiting outside.
- Andrews arrived armed; a confrontation ensued on the Bigelow porch. Andrews shot and killed Leonard. Witnesses disputed whether Leonard was armed or charged; knives were later found on the porch.
- Andrews was convicted of second-degree murder (while armed), assault with a deadly weapon, related firearm-possession counts (PFCV and others), and one count of felony threats based on the August 26 texts. He appealed, challenging the provocation/self-defense instruction and sufficiency of the threats evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Andrews) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence justified jury instruction that a person who deliberately places himself where his presence will provoke trouble forfeits self-defense | Andrews: No sufficient evidence he provoked Leonard; he had disengaged three days earlier and merely went to see Katina | Gov: Andrews knew Leonard had threatened him, ignored the warning and went to the house armed, so he voluntarily risked confrontation and provoked it | Affirmed: Evidence amply supported instruction; jury could find Andrews deliberately provoked the fatal conflict and forfeited self-defense |
| Whether provocation doctrine requires intent to provoke the adversary into violence | Andrews: (argued on appeal) instruction inappropriate without proof he intended to provoke violence | Gov: No intent-to-provoke requirement under D.C. precedent; forfeiture can follow from knowingly putting oneself in a trouble-provoking position | Court: Reaffirmed D.C. rule—no specific intent required; cannot change precedent in panel decision |
| Sufficiency of evidence that texts threatened Katina’s person (felony threats under D.C. Code § 22-1810) | Andrews: Texts threatened only property (her car), not her person, so conviction insufficient | Gov: Messages, in context of prior stalking/threats, could reasonably be read by an ordinary hearer (aware of circumstances) as threatening bodily harm | Affirmed: A reasonable jury could find texts conveyed fear of bodily harm to an ordinary hearer given context and Katina’s fear |
| Whether PFCV convictions merge | Andrews: (raised post-affirmance) two PFCV counts based on single possession during single act should not both stand | Gov: Conceded single possession supports merger | Remand for Superior Court to address merger; one PFCV conviction must be vacated |
Key Cases Cited
- Laney v. United States, 294 F. 412 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (early statement supporting forfeiture-of-self-defense when one places oneself in a trouble-provoking position)
- Peterson v. United States, 483 F.2d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (self-defense unavailable where defendant was the actual provoker)
- Nowlin v. United States, 382 A.2d 9 (D.C. 1978) (going to victim’s home after a threat can forfeit claim of self-defense)
- Sams v. United States, 721 A.2d 945 (D.C. 1998) (D.C. law does not require specific intent to provoke for forfeiture of self-defense)
- Rorie v. United States, 882 A.2d 763 (D.C. 2005) (discussing provocation and self-defense principles)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for sufficiency-of-the-evidence review)