Brand v. State
93 So. 3d 985
Ala. Crim. App.2011Background
- Brand pleaded guilty in 2006 to two counts of first‑degree sexual abuse and received two 20‑year sentences.
- Each sentence was split under the Split Sentence Act: 5 years confinement followed by 10 years probation per count.
- The trial court did not specify whether the split sentences should run concurrently or consecutively.
- Brand filed a Rule 32 petition in 2010 seeking postconviction relief, which the circuit court summarily dismissed.
- The court held Brand’s claims precluded or untimely, but the court discussed the legality of consecutive split sentences under Alabama law.
- On appeal, Brand argued the two consecutive 5‑year confinement periods exceeded the five‑year confinement cap per offense.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether consecutive split sentences are legal under the Split Sentence Act | Brand contends consecutive confinement periods exceed § 15‑18‑8(a)(1). | The State argues § 14‑3‑38 and the Split Sentence Act allow or tolerate consecutive periods. | Confinement portions may be evaluated per offense; total per offense within limits. |
| Whether § 14‑3‑38 requires both confinement and probation to run consecutively for split sentences | Brand asserts § 14‑3‑38 requires strict consecutive running of each sentence. | The majority holds per‑offense analysis; no automatic whole‑sentence consecutive rule. | Per‑offense evaluation; potential need for consecutive confinement, but probation within limits remains. |
| Whether the two consecutive 5‑year confinements violate § 15‑18‑8(a)(1) when applied to two offenses | Two consecutive 5‑year confinements exceed the five‑year cap. | Split Sentence Act contemplates multiple offenses with separate confinement terms. | Each offense has its own confinement limit; not a single combined cap for both offenses. |
| Whether the 10‑year probation portions render the sentence illegal | If probationary terms exceed statutory limits when aggregated, sentence is illegal. | Probation portions fall within the 15‑year probationary limit per split sentence. | Probation portions are within statutory limits per offense; not illegal. |
| Whether Brand’s Rule 32 petition was properly dismissed as untimely or precluded | Legal challenge to the sentence legality is jurisdictional and not barred. | Claims were precluded or time‑barred under Rule 32.2 and 32.2(c). | Rule 32 petition dismissed as deemed filed timely only for jurisdictional issues; other claims barred. |
Key Cases Cited
- Barnes v. State, 708 So.2d 217 (Ala.Crim.App.1997) (jurisdictional challenges to sentences outside Rule 32 bars)
- Reed v. State, 748 So.2d 231 (Ala.Crim.App.1999) (affirming denial if circuit court correct for any reason)
- Ex parte Jackson, 415 So.2d 1169 (Ala.1982) (probationary limits and consecutive probationary periods)
- Minshew v. State, 975 So.2d 395 (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (consecutive probation limits; obiter dicta on Youthful Offender Act)
- Gray v. State, 939 So.2d 962 (Ala.Crim.App.2006) (illegal sentence where total confinement exceeded cap after revocation)
- Phillips v. State, 932 So.2d 165 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (revocation of probation and total confinement exceed cap requires resentencing)
- Dixon v. State, 912 So.2d 292 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (time served affecting total confinement under Split Sentence Act)
- Moore v. State, 871 So.2d 106 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) (split sentence confinement limitations recognized)
- Austin v. State, 864 So.2d 1115 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) (jurisdictional issues with Split Sentence Act)
- McQueen v. State, 829 So.2d 783 (Ala.Crim.App.2002) (split sentence constraints)
- Holliday v. State, 75 So.3d 1220 (Ala.Crim.App.2011) (duty to notice illegal sentences)
- Burge v. State, 623 So.2d 450 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) (construes Split Sentence Act interplay with probation limits)