Branch v. Branch, 508 S.W.3d 911

James (Jimmy) and Stephanie (Quinn) Branch married in 2003 after signing a premarital agreement; they divorced in 2014 after eleven years of marriage.
Quinn sought to invalidate the premarital agreement under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-11-406(a)(2), claiming unconscionability and inadequate disclosure; Jimmy defended the agreement and counterclaimed for divorce.
Exhibits A and B to the premarital agreement listed Jimmy’s approximate net worth (~$1,000,000) and assets but did not state exact account balances; Quinn admitted receipt of those exhibits.
The circuit court found (1) Quinn proved the four elements of § 9-11-406(a)(2) and declared the agreement unenforceable; (2) alternatively, Jimmy materially breached the agreement by failing to make $5,000 annual contributions to Quinn’s retirement account and rescinded the agreement; and (3) ordered the marital house (titled in Jimmy’s name) sold and equity split equally.
On appeal, this Court reversed the finding that Quinn lacked a fair and reasonable disclosure (holding Exhibits A and B sufficed), reversed rescission because Jimmy’s breach was not material (parties had stipulated the monetary shortfall), and affirmed the equal division of the house as marital property.

Issue	Quinn's Argument	Jimmy's Argument	Held
Whether premarital agreement is unenforceable under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-11-406(a)(2)	Agreement was unconscionable; she lacked fair and reasonable disclosure, did not waive disclosure, and lacked adequate knowledge	Agreement was enforceable; court failed to apply all statutory requirements and Quinn did not prove the elements	Reversed: Quinn failed to prove lack of fair and reasonable disclosure; Exhibits A and B constituted adequate disclosure, so agreement not invalidated on § 9-11-406(a)(2) grounds
Whether Jimmy materially breached the premarital agreement by not making $5,000 annual contributions	Breach entitled Quinn to rescission of the agreement	Breach (failure to contribute) occurred but was not material; stipulated monetary remedy sufficed	Reversed rescission: breach occurred but was not material because stipulated payment provided the anticipated benefit
Whether the house purchased during marriage (titled in Jimmy’s name) was divisible marital property and whether equal division was erroneous	Quinn argued house was marital and subject to equitable division	Jimmy argued house was nonmarital (or he was entitled to credit for nonmarital funds traced into purchase and mortgage payments)	Affirmed: house acquired during marriage is marital; court did not clearly err in treating payments as marital and dividing equity equally

Taylor v. Taylor, 345 Ark. 300, 47 S.W.3d 222 (standard of review in domestic relations cases)
Norman v. Norman, 342 Ark. 493, 30 S.W.3d 83 (definition of clearly erroneous review)
Scudder v. Ramsey, 2013 Ark. 113, 426 S.W.3d 427 (de novo review for statutory interpretation)
Gooch v. Gooch, 10 Ark. App. 432, 664 S.W.2d 900 (generalized asset disclosure can be adequate)
Skokos v. Skokos, 344 Ark. 420, 40 S.W.3d 768 (trial court credibility determinations afforded deference)
Canady v. Canady, 290 Ark. 55, 721 S.W.2d 650 (tracing contributions may be inconsequential after long marriage)
Economy Swimming Pool Co. v. Freeling, 236 Ark. 888, 370 S.W.2d 438 (rescission available for material breach)
Spann v. Lovett & Co., 2012 Ark. App. 107, 389 S.W.3d 77 (definition and effect of material breach)