BRAITSCH v. CITY OF TULSA
436 P.3d 14
| Okla. | 2018Background
- Kelli Braitsch, a Tulsa police officer, injured her right arm on October 15, 2015 and pursued a workers’ compensation claim under the AWCA (85A O.S.).
- Under her collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and state law she received full salary (injury leave) during periods she was off work rather than statutory temporary total disability (TTD) benefits.
- The ALJ awarded permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits but ordered a reduction of $5,228.61 pursuant to 85A O.S. § 89 for wages paid by the employer in excess of the statutory TTD maximum.
- Braitsch challenged § 89 as violating procedural and substantive due process and as an unconstitutional special law; she also argued (in dissent) that § 89 impaired her CBA.
- The Workers’ Compensation Commission en banc affirmed the ALJ. The Oklahoma Supreme Court (majority) affirmed, rejecting due process and special-law challenges.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Procedural due process (PPD credit) | Braitsch: PPD is property; reduction by § 89 deprived her of property without adequate process. | Respondent: PPD vested under statutes effective at injury date; Braitsch received notice, hearing, counsel; no improper deprivation. | Held: No procedural due process violation; hearing and statutory framework satisfied notice and opportunity to be heard. |
| Substantive due process (economic burden shift) | Braitsch: § 89 arbitrarily shifts economic burden to injured worker without legitimate state interest (taking). | Respondent: Legislature has legitimate interests—fairness, predictability, uniformity, preventing disparities—rationally related to the credit rule. | Held: No substantive due process violation; statute rationally advances legitimate interests. |
| Special-law challenge (Art. 5 §46/§59) | Braitsch: § 89 is an unconstitutional special law that treats similar persons differently. | Respondent: § 89 operates uniformly on the defined classes (employers who pay wages over statutory TTD and employees who receive them); no subclass is carved out. | Held: § 89 is a general law (not an impermissible special law); uniform operation across the class. |
| Contract impairment (CBA) — raised in dissent | Braitsch/dissent: Application of § 89 undermines bargained-for injury leave and unlawfully reduces CBA benefits in violation of Art. 2 §15. | Majority: § 89 (AWCA) was in effect at time of injury; CBA does not specify PPD amounts or override statutory scheme; no impairment. | Held: Majority did not accept contract-impairment claim; dissent would have reversed on CBA grounds. |
Key Cases Cited
- Grant v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 5 P.3d 594 (Okla. 2000) (invalidated a workers’ comp provision as an impermissible special law for creating unequal treatment)
- Reynolds v. Porter, 760 P.2d 816 (Okla. 1988) (framework for determining whether a statute is general or special; equal treatment principle)
- Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC, 373 P.3d 1057 (Okla. 2016) (substantive due process—legislative economic regulation reviewed for rational relation to legitimate state interest)
- Maxwell v. Sprint PCS, 369 P.3d 1079 (Okla. 2016) (worker’s PPD award is a protected property interest subject to due process)
- Corbeil v. Emricks Van & Storage, 404 P.3d 856 (Okla. 2017) (benefits governed by law in effect on date of injury)
- Fent v. Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, 984 P.2d 200 (Okla. 1999) (strong presumption in favor of constitutionality; burden on challenger)
- Gilbert Central Corp. v. State, 716 P.2d 654 (Okla. 1986) (rule to interpret statutes to avoid constitutional doubt)