Brady v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Theatrical Drivers & Helpers Local 817
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2022
2d Cir.2014Background
- John Brady sought work through IBT Local 817's hiring hall intermittently from 1981–2007 and criticized a union member in 2007 about withheld per diem payments.
- In 2008 Brady was denied membership and told by Secretary-Treasurer O’Donnell that the denial was retaliation for his criticism; in 2012 a new Secretary-Treasurer refused to provide a membership application.
- IBT Local 817’s Constitution requires eligibility (good moral character and working in the jurisdiction) and three Formal Requirements for membership: written application, payment of fees/dues, and acceptance by the local.
- Brady alleges he met eligibility and that the union routinely granted membership without formal application, so its refusal was retaliatory in violation of Title I of the LMRDA.
- The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding Brady was neither a formal member nor a “member in substance.” The Second Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court has LMRDA jurisdiction over Brady's claim | Brady contends he was a "member in substance" because he met eligibility and the Formal Requirements are ministerial | Defendants contend Brady never fulfilled formal requirements and union retained discretion to accept members, so he is not a member | Court held no jurisdiction: Brady was neither a formal member nor a member in substance |
| Whether "member in substance" status can confer LMRDA protection | Brady argues that where officials fail to perform ministerial acts, protection still applies | Defendants argue the union constitution gives discretionary power to accept applications, so acts are not merely ministerial | Court adopts Hughes formulation but finds facts here do not show ministerial admission; membership decision was discretionary |
| Whether routine past practice of admitting without application makes admission ministerial | Brady argues the union's routine practice rendered the requirements ministerial | Defendants argue the constitutional language governs and discretion remained despite practice | Court rejects Brady’s reliance on informal practice when constitution plainly reserves acceptance discretion |
| Whether wrongful denial of membership is remediable under the LMRDA | Brady urges LMRDA remedy for retaliatory denial | Defendants assert LMRDA protects only relationships between unions and their members | Court holds wrongful denial of membership is not redressable under Title I when plaintiff is not a member |
Key Cases Cited
- Cruz v. FXDirectDealer, LLC, 720 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2013) (standard for pleading facts on appeal)
- Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2000) (Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional dismissal standard)
- Phelan v. Local 305 of United Ass’n of Journeymen, 973 F.2d 1050 (2d Cir. 1992) (LMRDA jurisdiction limited to union members)
- Hughes v. Local Number 11 of Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Ironworkers, 287 F.2d 810 (3d Cir. 1961) (formulation of "member in substance" where admission is ministerial)
- Gavin v. Structural Iron Workers Local No. 1, 553 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1977) (transfer approval not ministerial where constitution reserves discretion)
- Moynahan v. Pari-Mutuel Emps. Guild of Cal., Local 280, 317 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1963) (membership approval requiring vote not ministerial)
- LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Nomura Asset Capital Corp., 424 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2005) (contract language governs over inconsistent practices)
- Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234 (2d Cir. 1970) (wrongful denial of union membership outside LMRDA scope)