319 F. Supp. 3d 286
D.C. Cir.2018Background
- Plaintiff Rodney Bradshaw invoked Rule 615 sequestration at a bench trial; defendant USDA designated Dwight Jurey as its Rule 615(b) party representative.
- Bradshaw moved to exclude Jurey from the courtroom for the duration of trial or at least during Bradshaw's testimony.
- USDA opposed, arguing a designated party representative is entitled to remain under Rule 615(b) and that Jurey’s expected testimony was already clear.
- The core factual dispute is credibility between Bradshaw and Jurey about events over fifteen years earlier; the case is essentially a "he-said/he-said" credibility contest.
- The court recognized uncertainty in the District about whether Rule 615 precludes any court power to exclude a designated representative, but noted courts have managerial and Rule 611 authority to control witness examination and trial procedure.
- The court granted limited sequestration: Jurey excluded only during Bradshaw’s testimony (but may remain for other witnesses); court left open exclusion during any potential rebuttal testimony by Bradshaw.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a Rule 615(b)–designated party representative may be sequestered despite the Rule’s exemption | Bradshaw: Court may exclude Jurey to prevent tailoring of his testimony to Bradshaw’s in-court testimony | USDA: Rule 615(b) authorizes Jurey to remain; no need to sequester because Jurey’s testimony is already known | Court: Exercising inherent trial-management power and Rule 611, limited sequestration is appropriate to protect truth-seeking |
| Whether exclusion is necessary given the age and prior record of events | Bradshaw: Because credibility between the two witnesses is dispositive, exclusion prevents conscious or subconscious tailoring | USDA: Prior testimony and filings make Jurey’s testimony predictable, reducing risk of tailoring | Court: Risk of shaping testimony remains; exclusion during Bradshaw’s testimony warranted |
| Scope of sequestration authority when Rule 615(b) applies | Bradshaw: Rule 615 should not bar court from using other powers to sequester a representative | USDA: Rule 615(b) bars exclusion of designated employee representatives | Court: Rule 615(b) withholds authorization for exclusion but does not strip court of all discretion derived from Rule 611/inherent powers |
| Remedy granted and its limits | Bradshaw: Exclude Jurey for duration of trial or at least during his testimony | USDA: Opposed sequestration; sought to keep Jurey throughout | Court: Ordered Jurey excluded during Bradshaw’s testimony only; allowed in courtroom for other witnesses; left open later exclusion if Bradshaw testifies in rebuttal |
Key Cases Cited
- Minebea Co. v. Papst, 374 F. Supp. 2d 231 (D.D.C. 2005) (describing sequestration purposes and courts’ discretion to manage witness exclusion)
- Queen v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 842 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (discussion of sequestration and credibility protection)
- United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161 (1st Cir. 1993) (three-part sequestration framework and managerial power over witnesses)
- United States v. Engelmann, 701 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2012) (trial court discretion whether to allow government agent to testify while present at counsel table)
- United States v. Charles, 456 F.3d 249 (1st Cir. 2006) (Rule 615(b) narrows but does not eliminate court discretion to exclude case agents in exceptional cases)
- Opus 3 Ltd. v. Heritage Park, Inc., 91 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 1996) (affirming sequestration of an expert who was also a crucial fact witness)
- Farnham v. United States, 791 F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1986) (sequestration particularly important where credibility of party witnesses is outcome-determinative)