Bradley Darrington v. Milton Hershey School, 958 F.3d 188

Milton Hershey School (MHS) employed Bradley and Val Darrington as full‑time houseparents; they were members of Bakery, Confectionary, Tobacco Workers & Grain Millers Local Union 464 and thus covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA).
The CBA’s grievance/arbitration clause covers “any dispute alleging discrimination” under federal or state law and the Union waived members’ rights to bring private discrimination suits in state or federal court for matters encompassed by the grievance procedure.
The Darringtons objected to MHS’s mandatory religious programming; Bradley filed a child‑welfare report (dismissed) and filed EEOC/PHRC religious discrimination charges; MHS terminated the couple soon after the initial charge.
After right‑to‑sue letters issued, the Darringtons sued in federal court under Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA); MHS moved to compel arbitration under the CBA and the District Court denied the motion.
On appeal, the Third Circuit reviewed arbitrability de novo and evaluated whether the CBA “clearly and unmistakably” waived a judicial forum for statutory discrimination claims.
The Third Circuit held the CBA’s language did clearly and unmistakably waive the right to litigate Title VII and PHRA claims in court, including retaliation claims, and reversed to compel arbitration.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the CBA clearly and unmistakably waives employees’ right to vindicate federal statutory discrimination claims in court	Darringtons: CBA language is too general and does not explicitly waive judicial forum for statutory claims	MHS: CBA explicitly waives private suits for “any dispute alleging discrimination” under federal or state law	Held: Waiver is clear and unmistakable; Title VII claims must be arbitrated
Whether state PHRA claims require a different waiver standard or are preempted by the FAA	Darringtons: Pennsylvania may apply a different or more protective standard so PHRA claims shouldn’t be waived	MHS: FAA preempts contrary state rules; PHRA claims covered if CBA meets clear‑and‑unmistakable standard	Held: FAA preempts inconsistent state obstacles; PHRA claims arbitrable under the same standard
Whether retaliation claims fall within the CBA’s “discrimination” arbitration language	Darringtons: CBA does not explicitly reference retaliation	MHS: Retaliation is a form of discrimination and falls within the CBA’s broad coverage	Held: Retaliation is covered as discrimination; included in the waiver
Whether the arbitration clause is enforceable and covers the dispute	Darringtons: (did not successfully contest enforceability)	MHS: Clause is enforceable and broadly covers disputes about discrimination	Held: Enforceability not disputed; clause covers the Darringtons’ claims

Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (established the “clear and unmistakable” waiver standard for CBAs)
14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (CBA can bar judicial suits on statutory discrimination claims if waiver is explicit)
Jones v. Does 1–10, 857 F.3d 508 (3d Cir.) (applied waiver analysis to CBA discrimination provisions)
AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643 (arbitrability is a threshold question for courts to decide)
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (FAA preempts state rules that obstruct arbitration)
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (retaliation constitutes a form of discrimination)