802 F.3d 950
8th Cir.2015Background
- At ~4:20 a.m. on Sept. 9, 2012, Zhukov’s tractor-trailer stopped partly in I-80’s right lane after losing air-brake pressure; he activated hazards and warning reflectors but placed them improperly and too close to the trailer.
- At 4:34 a.m., Johnson’s tractor-trailer rear-ended Zhukov’s trailer, causing a fire and scattering debris that fully blocked both westbound lanes.
- A traffic backup about 0.86 miles long formed; emergency vehicles arrived or were en route, and many vehicles (including the Schmidts’) had hazard lights on.
- Around 5:14 a.m., trucker Josef Slezak, driving in excess of permitted hours and fatigued, struck stopped vehicles at ~75 mph without braking, killing Christopher and Diana Schmidt and their unborn child.
- Plaintiffs sued Zhukov, Johnson, and their employers, alleging their negligence in causing the first crash proximately caused the Schmidts’ deaths; district court granted summary judgment for defendants on proximate-cause grounds.
- The Eighth Circuit majority affirmed, holding Slezak’s unanticipated negligence was an efficient intervening cause as a matter of law; Judge Bye dissented, arguing foreseeability was a jury question.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendants’ negligence that caused the initial collision proximately caused the Schmidts’ deaths | The first crash and resultant traffic stoppage foreseeably created the risk of subsequent fatal collisions; secondary crashes are a known consequence of traffic obstructions | Slezak’s highly negligent conduct (fatigued, >hours-of-service, no braking, impact at 75 mph nearly a mile from initial crash, 36+–40 minutes later) was extraordinary and unforeseeable, breaking causation | Affirmed: Slezak’s negligence was an efficient intervening cause that severed proximate causation as a matter of law |
| Whether foreseeability should be decided by jury or as a matter of law | Foreseeability is fact-specific; reasonable jurors could find secondary crash foreseeable given common risk of follow-on collisions | Where intervening actor’s conduct is extraordinary/unforeseeable, court can decide foreseeability as matter of law | Court: Under Nebraska law, no reasonable jury could find Slezak’s actions foreseeable here; decided as matter of law |
| Applicability of Nebraska precedent on efficient intervening cause | Plaintiffs urge general risk of follow-on collisions makes initial negligence proximate cause | Defendants rely on Latzel and similar cases where third-party drivers’ disregard of obvious danger was unforeseeable | Court applied Nebraska’s Latzel framework and analogues to conclude intervening negligence was unforeseeable |
| Whether Heatherly requires a different result | Plaintiffs cite Heatherly to show negligent obstruction can foreseeably cause injuries from negligent drivers | Defendants distinguish Heatherly (direct collision with negligently parked truck) from this case (remote, extraordinary intervening driver conduct) | Court: Heatherly is distinguishable; Slezak’s conduct was extraordinary and unforeseeable, unlike Heatherly’s facts |
Key Cases Cited
- Latzel v. Bartek, 288 Neb. 1 (Neb. 2014) (defines efficient intervening cause and when third-party driver negligence severs causation)
- Heatherly v. Alexander, 421 F.3d 638 (8th Cir. 2005) (negligent placement of vehicle can be proximate cause when direct collision results)
- Blood v. VH-1 Music First, 668 F.3d 543 (7th Cir. 2012) (affirming no proximate cause where second crash occurred hours/miles later and intervening driver acted extraordinarily)
- Donegan v. Denney, 457 S.W.2d 953 (Ky. 1970) (original tort superseded where many motorists safely stopped and later collision was caused by intervening driver)
- Malolepszy v. State, 273 Neb. 313 (Neb. 2007) (state not liable where intervening driver’s sudden pull into traffic was unforeseeable)
- A.W. v. Lancaster Cty. Sch. Dist. 0001, 280 Neb. 205 (Neb. 2010) (foreseeability turns on facts; leave to jury unless no reasonable minds could differ)
- Morrow v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 541 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1976) (party creating obstruction must foresee some negligent responses, but not extraordinary ones)