Bradley A. Estabrook v. Mazak Corporation, 140 N.E.3d 830

In 2003 Mazak delivered a machine to General Products Corporation (GPC). In 2014 Bradley Estabrook was injured working on that machine.
Estabrook sued Mazak in federal court in 2016 alleging a design defect; Indiana law (the Indiana Products Liability Act) governs the claim.
The Act contains a ten-year statute of repose: actions must be brought within 10 years after delivery to the initial user, with a narrow exception allowing suit within two years after accrual if accrual occurs at least 8 but less than 10 years after delivery.
Estabrook sued within two years of accrual (2016) but more than ten years after delivery (2003), so under the Act his suit would be time-barred under the typical reading.
Estabrook urged a judicially suggested ‘‘new-product’’ exception (originating in Denu and cited in later cases) under which sufficient post-sale repair/refurbishment/reconstruction can create a new product and restart the repose clock.
The federal district court certified the question to the Indiana Supreme Court: can the statute of repose be extended by post-sale repair/refurbishment/reconstruction, and if so what test applies? The Indiana Supreme Court answered: no.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 10-year statute of repose in Ind. Code § 34-20-3-1(b) can be extended by post-sale repair/refurbishment/reconstruction (i.e., a "new-product" exception)	Post-sale reconstruction/refurbishment can produce a "new product," restarting the 10-year statutory clock and allowing otherwise time-barred suits	The statute's plain text contains no exception for post-sale modifications; the repose period cannot be extended by repairs or reconditioning	No. The Court held the statute contains no such exception and a manufacturer’s post-delivery repair/refurbishment/reconstruction does not restart the repose period

Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 418 N.E.2d 207 (Ind. 1981) (treated the statute as a limiting repose period and read the disjunctive 'or' effectively as 'and')
Denu v. Western Gear Corp., 581 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Ind. 1983) (dicta suggesting refurbishment/resale might create a ‘new’ product restarting the clock)
Richardson v. Gallo Equip. Co., 990 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1993) (expanded Denu dicta to include reconstruction/reconditioning that lengthens useful life; policy concern about incentivizing rebuilds)
Wenger v. Weldy, 605 N.E.2d 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (cited Denu as instructive on a reconditioning exception but found no relief on its facts)
Florian v. GATX Rail Corp., 930 N.E.2d 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (reaffirmed the Denu-type exception in the abstract; repainting did not create a new component to restart the clock)
R.R. v. State, 106 N.E.3d 1037 (Ind. 2018) (explained the high standard for applying the absurdity doctrine)
KS&E Sports v. Runnels, 72 N.E.3d 892 (Ind. 2017) (canon of interpreting statutes by their plain meaning)