957 F.3d 1237
11th Cir.2020Background
- Brad Knox, an African-American Roper Pump quality test technician for 15 years, struck his adult daughter during a domestic altercation; she reported the incident to Roper HR the next day.
- Roper suspended Knox under its workplace-violence policy and, after internal discussion, offered him three options: termination, resignation with severance (requiring a release), or unpaid leave to complete anger-management classes and keep his job.
- After Knox complained to an ethics hotline that he was being treated more harshly because of race, Roper sent a Last Chance Agreement (LCA) that included a broad release of claims (expressly including Title VII) as a condition to keep his job.
- Knox refused to sign the LCA because of the release, completed the anger-management classes anyway, and was fired; he sued under Title VII for retaliation and race discrimination; the district court granted summary judgment to Roper on both claims.
- The Eleventh Circuit reversed summary judgment on the retaliation claim (finding genuine disputes about whether the release was added in response to Knox’s complaint and whether he would have been fired but for his refusal) and affirmed summary judgment on the race-discrimination claim (concluding Knox’s comparators were not similarly situated).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Knox's termination was unlawful retaliation under Title VII | Roper conditioned continued employment on signing a release only after Knox complained; he would have signed absent the release and thus was fired for complaining | Knox violated workplace-violence policy and termination was legitimate; Roper always intended the release in the LCA | Reversed summary judgment for Roper on retaliation; factual disputes about timing/motive and but-for causation require a jury |
| Whether Knox proved race discrimination via comparators | Warner/Cruce and Ingram (white employees) were treated more favorably after similar violent incidents | Proposed comparators were not similarly situated in all material respects (different contexts, outcomes, supervisors) | Affirmed summary judgment for Roper; comparators not similarly situated |
| Whether Roper waived attorney-client privilege over LCA-drafting communications | Knox argued that counsel (in-house or outside) actually made the decision and that Renzetti’s testimony waived privilege | Roper said it did not assert advice-of-counsel, Renzetti testified he was decisionmaker and did not disclose privileged communications | Affirmed denial of discovery; privilege not waived and no implied waiver by selective testimony |
| Applicable causation standard for retaliation (but-for) | Knox: immediate conditioning and firing after complaint suffice to show but-for causation | Roper: preexisting right to terminate under workplace policy negates but-for causation | Court applied Nassar (but-for standard) and found Knox produced enough evidence that a reasonable juror could find but-for causation |
Key Cases Cited
- University of Texas Southwestern Medical Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (Title VII retaliation requires but-for causation)
- Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 1999) (conditioning employment on dropping complaints can support retaliation jury finding)
- Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2008) (refusal to sign agreement covering pending EEOC charge supported retaliation verdict)
- Chapter 7 Trustee v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2012) (conditioning an employment offer on dropping a charge supports retaliation inference)
- Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2019) (comparator must be similarly situated in all material respects)
- Little v. United Techs., Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 1997) (elements of a prima facie retaliation case)