645 F. App'x 428
6th Cir.2016Background
- Brackfield & Associates (Brackfield) is a BB&T customer; BB&T extended credit conditioned on detailed financial disclosures from Brackfield.
- BB&T filed a UCC financing statement on March 8, 2011 attaching Brackfield’s asset and liability listing and recorded it publicly in Tennessee.
- Brackfield discovered the filings in 2013 and Brackfield objected; BB&T amended the filing on March 22, 2013, but the amendments still contained sensitive records.
- Brackfield sued alleging RFPA violations and breach of contract, arguing the public record made Brackfield’s financial information accessible to the “entire world,” including government authorities.
- District court dismissed Brackfield’s RFPA claim for lack of Article III standing and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim; Brackfield appeals.
- RFPA prohibits disclosure of financial records to government authorities, defines government authority, and provides a private right of action for violations; Brackfield argues the public-record filings violated RFPA by making records accessible to the government.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Brackfield has standing under RFPA to sue. | Brackfield asserts a concrete RFPA injury from public disclosure. | BB&T argues Brackfield lacks injury in fact tied to RFPA violation. | No injury in fact; Brackfield lacks a concrete RFPA injury. |
| Whether RFPA creates Article III standing when records are placed in public record. | Brackfield contends RFPA injury arises from government access to records. | The act requires actual government access, not speculative public disclosure. | RFPA does not establish standing from mere public-record placement. |
| Whether the complaint plausibly alleges that BB&T provided access to government authorities. | Brackfield contends BB&T “provided” access when records were public. | No government authority actually obtained Brackfield’s records; claim speculative. | Insufficient factual allegation that a government authority accessed the records. |
Key Cases Cited
- Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (standing begins with statutory authorization; injury in fact required)
- Beaudry v. TeleCheck Servs., Inc., 579 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 2009) (statutory rights can confer standing when injury to statutory rights is concrete)
- Fieger v. Michigan Supreme Court, 553 F.3d 955 (6th Cir. 2009) (standing analysis applied at pleading stage)
- Imhoff Inv., L.L.C. v. Alfoccino, Inc., 792 F.3d 627 (6th Cir. 2015) (injury must be concrete, particularized, and personal in statutory-right claims)
- Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007) (statutory rights and injury-in-fact considerations; Sierra Club guidance)
- Amidax Trading Grp. v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRL, 671 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2011) (injury-in-fact in RFPA context can be established when information obtained by government)