Bozelko v. Papastavros
147 A.3d 1023
| Conn. | 2016Background
- Plaintiff Chandra Bozelko was convicted of multiple crimes after a 2007 criminal trial and later sued her trial counsel, Angelica Papastavros, for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, alleging numerous trial-preparation and performance failures.
- The trial court ordered plaintiff to disclose any expert at least 45 days before trial and warned that failure would lead to preclusion of expert testimony.
- Plaintiff disclosed a former habeas attorney who testified he was not retained as an expert and had no expert opinion; plaintiff identified no other expert.
- The trial court precluded plaintiff from presenting expert testimony and, because plaintiff had no expert to prove causation, granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
- The Appellate Court affirmed; the Connecticut Supreme Court granted certification and likewise affirmed, holding expert testimony is generally required to prove causation in legal malpractice claims except in rare, obvious cases, and juror testimony from the underlying trial cannot be used to establish causation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether expert testimony was required to prove causation in the legal malpractice/breach claims | Bozelko: expert testimony unnecessary; causation can be shown from record and juror perspective | Papastavros: expert testimony is required to show that different representation would have produced a different outcome | Held: Expert testimony is generally required to prove causation in legal malpractice cases; summary judgment proper where no expert produced |
| Whether allegations amounted to gross negligence obviating need for expert | Bozelko: claims alleged gross negligence so no expert needed | Papastavros: plaintiff’s allegations were not in the narrow "obvious" category | Held: Court assumed arguendo gross negligence but concluded causation still required expert proof; gross‑negligence exception did not rescue plaintiff |
| Whether juror testimony from the underlying criminal trial can establish causation | Bozelko: juror testimony could show how different defense would have changed verdicts | Papastavros: juror testimony would produce impermissible subjective standard; unreliable | Held: Juror testimony is improper for causation; malpractice action requires objective "what should have happened" standard proved by expert when beyond lay knowledge |
| Whether preclusion sanction and summary judgment were appropriate after nondisclosure of expert | Bozelko: nondisclosure resulted from other issues; sanction excessive | Papastavros: court’s preclusion was authorized by disclosure rules and justified | Held: Preclusion was an authorized sanction; without an expert on causation, summary judgment for defendant was proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Grimm v. Fox, 303 Conn. 322 (Conn. 2012) (expert testimony generally required to establish standard of care in legal malpractice)
- Arras v. Regional School Dist. No. 14, 319 Conn. 245 (Conn. 2015) (summary judgment standard described)
- Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, P.C. v. Beckett, 269 Conn. 613 (Conn. 2004) (definition of malpractice and elements of claim)
- Margolin v. Kleban & Samor, P.C., 275 Conn. 765 (Conn. 2005) (discussion of the "case within a case" approach in malpractice actions)
- LePage v. Horne, 262 Conn. 116 (Conn. 2002) (use of expert testimony in complex negligence contexts to inform jurors)