Boyer v. Health Grades, Inc., 2015 CO 40

Health Grades sued former employees Christopher Boyer and Patrick Singson alleging they created competing websites during employment and misused proprietary methods; claims included breach of loyalty, trade secret misappropriation, tortious interference, breach of contract, and conversion.
Boyer and Singson denied allegations and asserted an abuse of process counterclaim, alleging Health Grades’ suit lacked reasonable factual or legal basis and was filed to harass and hinder their livelihoods.
The district court denied summary judgment and directed verdict motions, submitted the counterclaim to the jury under the heightened POME standard, and the jury found for the defendants on the counterclaim while rejecting Health Grades’ claims.
The court of appeals concluded the district court erred by allowing the jury to apply the POME heightened standard and remanded for the trial court to make an independent judicial determination whether Health Grades’ claims were immune under the Petition Clause; on rehearing, it adhered to that remand despite this court’s later General Steel decision.
The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that General Steel’s rationale—refusing to apply POME’s heightened sham-standard to purely private disputes—applies equally to court-filed actions, reversing the court of appeals and directing affirmation of the jury verdict.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether POME’s heightened sham-standard applies to lawsuits involving purely private disputes	Health Grades argued its suit was proper and that POME governs abuse-of-process review	Boyer/Singson argued POME should not apply because the dispute was purely private and therefore not entitled to the heightened petition-immunity framework	Court held POME’s heightened standard is inapplicable to purely private disputes; lower court’s remand under POME was reversed
Whether General Steel’s arbitration-focused holding limits application of POME to arbitration only	Health Grades contended General Steel was limited to arbitration and did not control court-filed suits	Defendants argued General Steel’s reasoning extends to court actions involving private disputes	Court held General Steel’s rationale applies equally to court actions; POME does not extend to purely private litigation
Proper forum for deciding whether claims are immune under the Petition Clause (judge vs jury)	Health Grades and court of appeals favored a judicial, independent determination under POME	Defendants relied on the jury verdict and argued the jury could decide under ordinary standards since POME did not apply	Because POME does not apply here, the jury’s verdict stands and no independent POME judicial determination was required

Protect Our Mountain Env’t v. Dist. Court, 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984) (articulated heightened standard for abuse-of-process claims involving petitioning activity)
General Steel Domestic Sales, LLC v. Bacheller, 291 P.3d 1 (Colo. 2012) (held POME’s heightened standard inapplicable to arbitration arising from a purely private dispute)
In re Foster, 253 P.3d 1244 (Colo. 2011) (addressed POME-related concerns in attorney-discipline context without extending POME broadly)
E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (origin of Noerr-Pennington petition-immunity doctrine)
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (extended Noerr principles to certain lobbying/petitioning activities)
Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) (applied sham exception to judicial petitioning in antitrust context)
Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983) (discussed limits of petition-immunity in labor disputes and public-interest contexts)
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (litigation as political expression when vindicating public rights)