Boyce Willard v. Mississippi State Parole Board
212 So. 3d 80
| Miss. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Willard, sentenced for murder in 1984 to life with parole eligibility after 10 years, sought parole repeatedly but was denied; he became parole-eligible in 1994.
- In 2014 the Parole Board again denied parole and imposed a five-year set-off for future reconsideration.
- Willard filed a 2015 circuit court motion for declaratory and injunctive relief asserting due-process violations and challenging the five-year set-off.
- The circuit court dismissed the motion for lack of ARP exhaustion and later on substantive grounds, citing HB 585 amendments rendering Willard ineligible for parole.
- The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding no constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole and affirming the Board’s discretion and lack of due-process violation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 47-7-18 creates a liberty interest in parole. | Willard argues mandatory language creates entitlement. | Parole remains discretionary; no liberty interest created. | Not a liberty interest; no due-process violation. |
| Whether Board’s use or omission of 47-7-18 procedures violated due process. | Procedural mandates were ignored in determinations. | Procedures not constitutionally mandatory; discretionary denial valid. | No due-process violation; Board's discretion sustained. |
| Whether a five-year set-off for parole reconsideration violates 47-7-18(6). | Set-off improperly extends hearing intervals and violates statute. | Set-off permissible under statutory framework. | No error; lawful under statute as applied. |
| Whether HB 585 amendments to 47-7-3 and 3.1 render Willard ineligible. | Old inmates should be protected; prospective application suggested. | Statutes apply prospectively; Willard predates amendments. | Ineligible for parole under amendments; upheld. |
| Whether circuit court erred in dismissing for lack of prerequisites for injunctive relief. | Challenged MDOC ARP exhaustion and jurisdictional issues. | No exhaustion; court lacked jurisdiction to grant relief. | Dismissal affirmed; no injunctive relief warranted. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rochelle v. State, 36 So. 3d 479 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (Parole decisions fall within board’s discretion; no right of appeal implied)
- Mangum v. Miss. Parole Bd., 76 So. 3d 762 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (No constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole; appeal rights are statutory)
- Cotton v. Mississippi Parole Board, 863 So. 2d 917 (Miss. 2003) (Parole denial not subject to circuit-court jurisdiction absent statutory authority)
- Hopson v. Miss. State Parole Bd., 976 So. 2d 973 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (Parole control rests with Board; discretionary decision-making confirmed)
- Vice v. State, 679 So. 2d 205 (Miss. 1996) (Parole system does not create a protected liberty interest absent mandatory language)
- Harden v. State, 547 So. 2d 1150 (Miss. 1989) (Defendants lack liberty interest in parole; Board retains discretion)
- Pope v. Brock, 912 So. 2d 935 (Miss. 2005) (Statutory language governs interpretation; prospective operation considerations)
- Marx v. Broom, 632 So. 2d 1315 (Miss. 1994) (Statutes construed to have prospective operation unless manifestly contrary)