Bowling v. State
289 Ga. 881
| Ga. | 2011Background
- Bowling was convicted of felony murder and aggravated assault for the shooting death of Melody Harrell following events in Buford, Georgia on April 24, 2004.
- Earlier that night, Bowling and Harrell, along with family members, were at the Hideaway bar where Bowling disturbed other patrons and was escorted out.
- Police arrived after a parking lot incident; Bowling departed in a van driven by Harrell, and a later crash on Bona Road placed Bowling at the scene with Harrell injured.
- At the hospital, Bowling’s blood-alcohol content was .142 and his urine test was positive for cocaine, marijuana, opiates, and benzodiazepines.
- Investigators obtained and executed a search warrant at Gwinnett Medical Center (May 13, 2009) seeking medical records from Bowling’s April 24, 2004 treatment.
- Bowling made multiple statements at the scene and in the hospital admitting the shooting as an accident and indicating the location of the gun.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of medical records search warrant | Bowling argues Fourth Amendment and Georgia privacy rights prohibit warrantless medical record access. | State contends warrant was proper and records were relevant to the crime. | Warrant valid; records properly seized and admissible. |
| Applicability of Fourth Amendment/Georgia privacy to medical records | Bowling maintains privacy in medical records barred disclosure. | State shows public safety/administrative needs justify disclosure under warrant. | Privacy interests balanced against legitimate government interests; warrants upheld. |
| Confrontation Clause implications of medical-records evidence | Medical records are testimonial and violate Crawford if used without opportunity to cross-examine declarants. | Medical records were not testimonial as created for treatment; declarant cross-examined; no Crawford violation. | No Confrontation Clause violation; records not testimonial. |
| Miranda warnings and suppression of statements at scene/hospital | Statements made before Miranda warnings were improperly admitted. | Public-safety and noncustodial circumstances support admissibility; some statements cumulative but harmless. | Miranda-related statements properly admitted; some evidence admitted under public-safety/voluntary-remarks; harmless error for any overlapping portions. |
| Ineffective assistance for speedy-trial demand | Failure to file out-of-time speedy-trial demand was ineffective assistance. | Decision not to file was strategic to pursue investigation and corroborate alibi; reasonable under Strickland. | Counsel’s strategic decision not to file did not constitute ineffective assistance. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (evidence sufficiency standard)
- King v. State, 276 Ga. 126 (2003) (privacy and warrant analysis in medical-records context)
- King v. State, 276 Ga. 128 (2003) (King II; warrant balancing approach)
- Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (public-safety exception to Miranda)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Confrontation Clause; testimonial statements)
- Hatcher v. State, 286 Ga. 491 (2010) (admission of voluntary statements and related issues)