BOWERS v. FLICK
2017 OK CIV APP 49
| Okla. Civ. App. | 2017Background
- On Jan. 5, 2015, Katie Bowers obtained an emergency ex parte protective order against Matthew Flick; a full hearing was set for Jan. 20, 2015.
- At the Jan. 20, 2015 hearing the court entered a "Continued Order" (labeled like the ex parte order) that included a one‑year review date of Jan. 20, 2016 and stated the order would remain in effect until after the full hearing; the transcript of that 2015 hearing is not in the record.
- At the Jan. 20, 2016 review hearing both parties appeared; the court found violations and entered a five‑year final protective order effective Jan. 20, 2016 to Jan. 20, 2021 under 22 O.S. § 60.4(G)(1)(a).
- Flick appealed, arguing the court lacked authority to extend the order beyond five years (and effectively to six years from the original 2015 order) because the 2015 continued order could not lawfully remain in effect beyond the full hearing.
- The Court of Civil Appeals reviewed statutory interpretation de novo and abuse of discretion for factual/ discretionary rulings, and concluded the 2016 final order improperly extended the protective period beyond five years.
- The court affirmed the protective order but modified its duration to terminate on Jan. 20, 2020 (limiting it to five years measured from the effective protective period as interpreted by the court).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether court could convert/continue an emergency/continued order into a final order at the 1‑year review | Bowers: review hearing could result in final order after finding violations | Flick: court had no jurisdiction to extend or convert the order beyond the statutory five‑year maximum; 2015 continued order could not lawfully remain beyond full hearing | Court: trial court could enter a final order after the 2016 hearing, but the five‑year duration as applied extended the order beyond statute and must be reduced to comply with §60.4(G)(1)(a) |
| Whether the 2015 Continued Order functioned as a lawful ex parte order or created a mechanism to extend protection beyond statutory limits | Bowers: continued order and review were proper exercise of court discretion to impose conditions and review compliance | Flick: the Continued Order was not a lawful mechanism to evade the statutory fixed‑period rule and cannot be used to create an extra year before a 5‑year period | Court: the Continued Order was within court discretion to impose conditions and schedule review, but it cannot be used to extend protection beyond the statutory 5‑year maximum without consent or motion to extend |
| Whether violations at the review hearing permit extending duration beyond five years as a penalty | Bowers: violations justify entry of final protective order and its duration | Flick: violations cannot be punished by extending the protective order beyond the statutory cap | Court: penalties for violations exist elsewhere in statute; there is no statutory authority to extend the protective order duration as a penalty beyond five years |
| Proper statutory construction of §60.4(G)(1) re: fixed vs continuous orders | Bowers: court may choose fixed or continuous based on findings, and may set review/conditions | Flick: legislative scheme requires either fixed (≤5 years) or continuous with specified findings; no other hybrid/status allowed | Court: statute is clear—after full hearing court must either deny, enter fixed (≤5 years) or continuous (on enumerated findings); no authority for a continued emergency order to extend duration beyond statutory limits |
Key Cases Cited
- Curry v. Streater, 213 P.3d 550 (Okla. 2009) (abuse‑of‑discretion standard and analogy of protective orders to injunctions)
- Spielmann v. Hayes ex rel. Hayes, 3 P.3d 711 (Okla. Civ. App. 2000) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- Hogg v. Oklahoma County Juvenile Bureau, 298 P.3d 29 (Okla. 2012) (cardinal rule: give effect to legislative intent; plain meaning controls)
- Sanford v. Sanford, 370 P.3d 1220 (Okla. Civ. App. 2016) (purpose of Act is preventing violence and statutory interpretation of protective‑order scheme)
- Holeman v. White, 292 P.3d 65 (Okla. Civ. App. 2012) (Protection from Domestic Abuse Act interpreted in context of legislative purpose)
- Marquette v. Marquette, 686 P.2d 990 (Okla. Civ. App. 1984) (statutory presumptions regarding legislative drafting and purpose)