Bowen v. City and County of Denver, Denver Sheriff Department, 1:24-cv-00917

Joseph Bowen, a male sergeant with the Denver Sheriff Department, was not promoted to Captain during the 2019–2021 promotion cycle, despite being in the top assessment band.
The Department made procedural changes to promotions: candidates with high assessment scores were grouped together, and promotions were not solely based on rank order.
Three women were promoted to Captain during this period; two had lower scores than Bowen.
Bowen alleges he was denied promotion due to sex discrimination and that stated reasons (rigid management, a pending investigation) were pretextual or inaccurate.
The Department had informally committed to a workforce that was 30% female by 2030, but had not formally taken the 30x30 Initiative pledge.
Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), arguing Bowen's allegations did not state a claim for reverse sex discrimination under Title VII.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of "background circumstances" for reverse discrimination	Bowen claims the Department's female recruitment and promotion process shows bias against men	Department argues Bowen failed to allege facts showing it is an employer that discriminates against men	Court agrees with Defendant—background allegations alone insufficient
Allegations of pretext as support for discrimination claim	Bowen argues reasons for denial were false, supporting an inference of discriminatory motive	Pretext alone does not compel finding of discrimination, and no direct nexus alleged	Court finds pretext allegations allow claim to proceed at pleading stage
Impact of promotion process changes	Bowen asserts new banding system allowed less-qualified women to be promoted over more-qualified men	Department denies changes were discriminatory or that sex was a promotion factor	Court finds no factual allegations the changes facilitated discrimination against men
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings standard met	Bowen claims complaint plausibly pleads Title VII discrimination under Rule 12(c) standard	Department says allegations do not state a plausible Title VII reverse discrimination claim	Court denies motion; factual dispute over pretext precludes judgment

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (establishing plausibility standard for pleadings)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleadings must state a plausible claim for relief)
Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2013) (prima facie case for Title VII promotion discrimination)
Adamson v. Multi Cmty. Diversified Servs., Inc., 514 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2008) (reverse discrimination pleading standard)
Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2009) (Rule 12(b)(6) motion-to-dismiss standard)