Bowen Ex Rel. Estate of Bowen v. Warden, Baldwin State Prison
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 11298
| 11th Cir. | 2016Background
- In March 2010 Carl Merkerson, a convicted murderer with severe paranoid schizophrenia and a Level III mental-health designation, had recently assaulted a cellmate and was placed in Unit K-3 (segregation). Prison Placement Guidelines required inmates like Merkerson to be housed alone.
- On March 7, 2010 Terrance Bowen, also a mental-health inmate and substantially smaller than Merkerson, was double-celled with Merkerson despite no documented justification and despite a unit layout that made the cell not readily observable and lacking an alarm.
- Deputy Warden Doug Underwood inspected the cell the morning of the attack and saw both men inside; Supervising Officer Cager Edward Davis signed the cell checklist that morning and reviewed the unit population chart. Both allegedly knew Merkerson’s mental-health status and recent assault history.
- On March 9, 2010 Merkerson brutally beat Bowen to death. The administrator of Bowen’s estate sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims against several prison officials, including Underwood and Davis in their individual capacities.
- The district court dismissed the claims against Underwood and Davis, finding inadequate allegations of subjective knowledge and concluding they were entitled to qualified immunity. The administrator appealed only those dismissals.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Underwood and Davis were subjectively aware of a substantial risk to Bowen | Allegations show officials knew Merkerson was a violent, Level III schizophrenic who had recently committed a "High-Assault," was larger than Bowen, and was housed contrary to Placement Guidelines — permitting inference they knew the risk | Officials said pleadings show only generalized awareness of problem behavior (insufficient for subjective knowledge) and lack specific notice (e.g., Bowen’s removal request or mother’s call) | Court held the complaint sufficiently alleged subjective knowledge (distinguishable from Carter; akin to Cottone) |
| Whether defendants’ conduct violated the Eighth Amendment (failure to protect) | Allowing double-celling of a known violent, mentally ill inmate in an unobservable cell amounted to deliberate indifference | Defendants argued no clearly established law made their conduct unconstitutional and they lacked requisite subjective awareness | Court found pleadings state an Eighth Amendment violation on the pleadings stage |
| Whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity | Plaintiff: prior Eleventh Circuit law (Cottone, Caldwell) gave fair warning that total failure to monitor/act regarding visibly violent mentally ill inmates violates the Eighth Amendment | Defendants: claimed qualified immunity because law did not clearly proscribe their specific conduct in 2010 | Court held qualified immunity not warranted at this stage; Cottone/Caldwell gave fair warning |
| Whether the district court’s dismissal should be affirmed | Plaintiff: dismissal was improper as factual allegations permit inference of subjective knowledge and deliberate indifference | Defendants: dismissal proper for failure to plead necessary subjective element and for qualified immunity | Court reversed dismissal as to Underwood and Davis and remanded; affirmed in all other respects |
Key Cases Cited
- Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding failure to monitor a visibly violent, mentally unstable inmate can constitute deliberate indifference)
- Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090 (11th Cir. 2014) (reiterating Cottone and addressing clearly established law for qualified immunity)
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (deliberate indifference standard for failure-to-protect claims requires subjective awareness of substantial risk)
- Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2003) (distinguishes generalized knowledge of dangerousness from particularized risk required for liability)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard: factual matter must state a plausible claim)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (establishing plausibility pleading standard)