Bowen ex rel. Doe v. Arnold
2016 Tenn. LEXIS 637
| Tenn. | 2016Background
- In 2011 John Doe N (a minor) accused William E. Arnold, Jr. of repeated rape and aggravated sexual battery; Arnold was later criminally tried, convicted by a jury, and his convictions were affirmed on appeal.
- Prior to the criminal indictment a civil suit was filed by the victim’s mother (Ms. Bowen) on behalf of John Doe N against Arnold and several organizations, alleging intentional molestation and related negligence.
- After criminal convictions were affirmed, Ms. Bowen moved for partial summary judgment in the civil case, arguing Arnold was collaterally estopped from denying he raped and sexually battered John Doe N.
- The trial court granted partial summary judgment, finding John Doe N was in privity with the State for collateral estoppel purposes; the court stayed further proceedings to allow interlocutory review.
- The Tennessee Court of Appeals declined interlocutory review; the Tennessee Supreme Court granted review to decide whether Tennessee should abolish the strict mutuality requirement and whether the criminal convictions preclude relitigation in the civil suit.
- The Tennessee Supreme Court abolished the strict party-mutuality rule for offensive and defensive collateral estoppel, adopted Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 29 and 85 as guidance, and affirmed the trial court’s partial summary judgment against Arnold on the issue of whether he raped and sexually battered John Doe N.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a criminal conviction precludes a later civil defendant from relitigating the same factual issue (offensive collateral estoppel). | Bowen: Criminal conviction should preclude relitigation; mutuality should be abrogated or privity found between victim and State. | Arnold: Criminal and civil proceedings are distinct; party mutuality lacking because victim not a party to criminal case; affidavit of innocence creates triable issue. | Court: Yes — a final criminal conviction can preclude relitigation in civil suit under Restatement §§ 29 and 85 when §29/§85 factors support preclusion. |
| Whether Tennessee should retain the strict mutuality requirement for collateral estoppel. | Bowen: Mutuality should be abolished; courts should follow Restatement §§ 29 and 85. | Arnold: Mutuality remains required; criminal conviction should not bind nonparty victim absent privity. | Court: Abolished strict mutuality for offensive and defensive collateral estoppel; adopt Restatement §§ 29 and 85 as guidance. |
| Whether John Doe N (victim) was in privity with the State for collateral estoppel purposes. | Bowen: Victim effectively in privity with prosecuting authority in criminal case. | Arnold: Victim was not a party or in privity; thus mutuality not met. | Court: Need not rest on privity here; applied Restatement §85 (incorporating §29) and found preclusion appropriate without strict privity requirement. |
| Whether Arnold had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in criminal proceedings (considering fairness factors). | Bowen: Criminal trial provided full protections (beyond‑reasonable‑doubt, counsel, appeal), so relitigation is unwarranted. | Arnold: He maintained innocence and argued his affidavit raises factual dispute; civil forum differences mean relitigation should be allowed. | Court: Arnold had full and fair opportunity (vigorous criminal defense, unanimous verdict, appellate review); no §29/§28 factors justified relitigation. |
Key Cases Cited
- Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (U.S. 1971) (abolished mutuality requirement for defensive collateral estoppel)
- Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (U.S. 1979) (permitted nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel and granted trial courts broad discretion)
- Mullins v. State, 294 S.W.3d 529 (Tenn. 2009) (describing Tennessee collateral estoppel elements and standard of review)
- State v. Scarbrough, 181 S.W.3d 650 (Tenn. 2005) (criminal context limitation: prosecution may not use collateral estoppel offensively in a criminal case)
- Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal.2d 807 (Cal. 1942) (early rejection of strict mutuality requirement)