Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, 604 U.S. 6

Amina Bouarfa, a U.S. citizen, filed a visa petition for her noncitizen spouse, Ala’a Hamayel, which was initially approved by USCIS.
USCIS later uncovered evidence indicating that Hamayel had previously entered a sham marriage to evade immigration laws, which would bar approval under 8 U.S.C. §1154(c).
Based on this, USCIS revoked the approved petition under the Secretary of Homeland Security’s authority in 8 U.S.C. §1155, which allows revocation for “good and sufficient cause.”
Bouarfa challenged the revocation as arbitrary and unsupported by the evidence, but the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed USCIS’s revocation.
The District Court dismissed Bouarfa’s suit, holding that 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to review such discretionary decisions, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed this dismissal.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether federal courts could review the Secretary’s discretionary revocation of a visa petition under §1155 on sham-marriage grounds.

Issue	Plaintiff’s Argument	Defendant’s Argument	Held
Whether the decision to revoke a previously approved visa petition is discretionary	Bouarfa: Revocation here was mandatory once a sham-marriage was determined, not discretionary under §1155	Mayorkas: §1155 grants broad discretion to revoke for “good and sufficient cause”	The Secretary’s revocation is discretionary and within §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); courts lack jurisdiction
Whether §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars judicial review of such revocation decisions	Bouarfa: The jurisdiction-stripping provision should not apply to non-discretionary revocations	Mayorkas: §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) clearly precludes review of discretionary revocation	§1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes judicial review of revocation decisions made under §1155
Whether §1154(c) creates a duty to revoke upon discovery of sham marriage	Bouarfa: §1154(c) imposes an ongoing duty to revoke if a prior sham marriage is discovered	Mayorkas: §1154(c) only applies up to initial approval, not ongoing; §1155 governs revocations	§1154(c) does not mandate revocation after approval; §1155’s discretion governs revocation decisions
The applicability of precedent or presumption in favor of judicial review	Bouarfa: Presumption of judicial review should apply absent clear congressional intent to bar it	Mayorkas: §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) provides clear congressional intent to bar judicial review	Clear statutory language overcomes presumption; intent to bar review is evident

United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321 (statutory construction and agency deference)
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (discretionary agency authority may preclude judicial review)
Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (discretionary decisions specified by statute cannot be reviewed)
Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328 (discretionary relief and threshold findings distinguished for jurisdiction)
Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221 (clarifies clear and convincing evidence standard for preclusion of judicial review)