Boswell v. City of Chicago
69 N.E.3d 379
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2016Background
- The City of Chicago created an independent Office of Compliance by municipal ordinance in 2007 (to replace a federal hiring monitor arising from the long-running Shakman litigation) and specified a 4-year term for the executive director with removal only for cause and procedural protections (notice, hearing before city council, counsel, council vote).
- Anthony Boswell was appointed executive director in late 2007, began in January 2008, and resigned March 29, 2010, alleging constructive discharge after sustained interference, harassment, suspension, and staff/duty removals.
- Boswell sued the City in 2014 alleging breach of contract (contending the ordinance and related hiring promises created contractual rights) and promissory estoppel (relying on oral promises about the office’s independence), after the trial court dismissed both counts on the City's combined 2-615/2-619 motion.
- The appellate court reviewed de novo and considered the ordinance’s text and the Shakman litigation context (the ordinance was intended to secure an independent compliance mechanism acceptable to the federal court) and took Boswell’s factual allegations as true at the pleading stage.
- The majority held the ordinance manifested an intent to create contractual rights for the executive director (term, removal-for-cause and procedural protections akin to Duldulao-style promises) and reversed the dismissal as to both breach of contract and promissory estoppel; the dissent argued statutes presumptively do not create private contracts and would have affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the municipal ordinance created a private contract enforceable by Boswell | Ordinance’s four-year term and detailed removal procedures (notice, hearing, counsel, council vote), plus hiring-stage promises, show intent to create contractual rights and Boswell accepted by commencing work | Ordinance is a policy statement; presumption against statutes creating private contractual rights; no express contractual language or individualized offer | Court: Reversed dismissal — ordinance, in context, could create a contract; pleadings sufficient to survive motion to dismiss |
| Whether promissory estoppel claim is viable against the City | City officials made specific promises about independence and support; Boswell reasonably relied (moved family, left prior job) to his detriment | Estoppel against public bodies is disfavored; ordinances and public statements cannot be treated as unambiguous promises binding the City | Court: Reversed dismissal — pleadings sufficiently allege unambiguous promises, reasonable reliance and detriment to state a claim at this stage |
Key Cases Cited
- Tomczak v. City of Chicago, 765 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1985) (background history of Shakman litigation and federal hiring monitor)
- Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 115 Ill.2d 482 (1987) (employee handbook promises may form enforceable contract if offer and acceptance are present)
- Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education, 142 Ill.2d 54 (1990) (presumption that legislative enactments do not create private contractual rights)
- Unterschuetz v. City of Chicago, 346 Ill. App.3d 65 (2004) (ordinance expressing policy does not create contractual rights)
- Dopkeen v. Whitaker, 399 Ill. App.3d 682 (2010) (statute creating office and term of office does not, by itself, create contract absent specific employee rights)
- Chicago Limousine Service, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 335 Ill. App.3d 489 (2002) (ordinances generally directed to public do not create enforceable private promises)
- Quake Constr., Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 141 Ill.2d 281 (1990) (elements of promissory estoppel: unambiguous promise, reliance, foreseeability, detriment)