Boston Redevelopment Authority v. National Park Service
125 F. Supp. 3d 325
D. Mass.2015Background
- BRA (Boston Redevelopment Authority) received an LWCF grant in 1981 to fund reconstruction and park development at Long Wharf; applicants must submit a dated project boundary map establishing the Section 6(f) protected area.
- NPS records include a “PROJECT AREA MAP” dated March 27, 1980 (with a metes-and-bounds description) that shades nearly all of Long Wharf and labels the seaward tip as “PHASE I — PARK AREA.” BRA also had a 1983 state map in DCS files that suggested a narrower park area.
- In 1983 NPS approved construction of the open-air Long Wharf Pavilion (built 1988) after concluding the MBTA easements and pavilion would not convert protected 6(f) land; the 1980 map appears in the agency file and DCS later resubmitted it in connection with MBTA approvals.
- In 2009 NPS (relying on DCS’s view and a 1983 map) indicated the pavilion was not within the 6(f) area; BRA proceeded with permitting and sought conversion to a restaurant in 2006–09.
- In 2012–2014, after retired NPS employees alerted the Service to the 1980 map in the federal file, NPS reexamined its records, concluded the 1980 map was the original 6(f) boundary, and issued a final decision that Long Wharf Pavilion is within the 6(f) restricted area.
- BRA sued under the LWCF Act, APA, Declaratory Judgment Act, and invoked judicial estoppel; cross-motions for summary judgment were filed. The court denied BRA’s motion and granted NPS’s motion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (BRA) | Defendant's Argument (NPS) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether NPS’s 2014 decision placing the Pavilion inside the 6(f) boundary was arbitrary and capricious under the APA | The 1980 map was never the parties’ agreed 6(f) boundary; it conflicts with other records (including a 1983 map), fails LWCF manual requirements, and NPS misapplied procedure | The 1980 project-area map and metes-and-bounds were submitted with BRA’s 1980 application, match the narrative, comply with manual requirements, and constitute the official 6(f) boundary in the administrative record | Court: NPS decision was not arbitrary or capricious; record supports reliance on 1980 map |
| Whether NPS may revisit and reverse its 2009 position that the Pavilion was outside the 6(f) area | NPS should be estopped or bound by its prior representations to Massachusetts DEP and state tribunals | Agencies may reconsider prior positions; here NPS changed course after discovering historical federal records and did so in good faith with opportunity for BRA to respond | Court: NPS permissibly reconsidered; change was not arbitrary and not barred |
| Whether judicial estoppel bars NPS from asserting in federal court that the Pavilion is protected when NPS earlier told state authorities otherwise | NPS persuaded state processes to allow the permit, so estoppel should prevent reversal | Government’s change was in good faith and courts are reluctant to apply estoppel against the sovereign, especially where public interests and enforcement of federal law are implicated | Court: Judicial estoppel not applied; NPS changed position in good faith and doctrine is disfavored against the government |
| Scope of this decision and remedy implications | BRA argued broad practical consequences and defects in closeout should nullify protections | Court limited ruling to whether Pavilion falls within 6(f); did not resolve issues as to other tenants or affirmative defenses | Court: Ruling confined to Pavilion’s inclusion in 6(f); left other potential claims/defenses for another day |
Key Cases Cited
- Massachusetts v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 708 F.3d 63 (1st Cir.) (articulating arbitrary-and-capricious review principles)
- Lovgren v. Locke, 701 F.3d 5 (1st Cir.) (administrative review ordinarily limited to the administrative record)
- Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (Supreme Court) (courts must defer to reasonable agency determinations)
- New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (Supreme Court) (doctrine and prerequisites for judicial estoppel)
- Dantran, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 171 F.3d 58 (1st Cir.) (reluctance to apply estoppel against the government and limits on estopping the sovereign)