Boston Bit Labs, Inc. v. Baker, 11 F.4th 3

Bit Bar, a restaurant/arcade in Salem, MA, sued Governor Baker under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after COVID-19 Order No. 43 placed arcades in Phase IV while keeping casinos in Phase III, alleging First and Fourteenth Amendment injuries and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief (no money damages).
Bit Bar moved for a preliminary injunction to bar enforcement of restrictions treating arcades more restrictively than Phase III enterprises; Governor Baker moved to dismiss as moot after modifying the orders.
Shortly after litigation began, COVID-19 Order No. 50 reclassified arcades back to Phase III; later, Order No. 69 terminated the COVID-19 state of emergency and rescinded the emergency orders issued under the Civil Defense Act.
The district court dismissed Bit Bar’s claims as moot, finding no reasonable expectation the Governor would reimpose the disputed restrictions and concluding the voluntary-cessation doctrine did not save the case.
On appeal the First Circuit reviewed mootness de novo, rejected Bit Bar’s argument that voluntary cessation could not moot the case because the Governor might reinstate restrictions, and affirmed dismissal as moot.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Mootness of injunctive relief	Cessation is voluntary; Governor could reinstate restrictions, so claim is not moot	Orders were changed and the emergency terminated, so there is no ongoing conduct to enjoin	Dismissed as moot — no ongoing conduct to enjoin
Mootness of declaratory relief	A declaration remains meaningful because it would constrain any future restrictions	The challenged order and emergency powers have been rescinded, so no real, immediate controversy exists	Dismissed as moot — no substantial, immediate controversy
Application of voluntary-cessation doctrine	Doctrine applies because Governor could "at a whim" reinstate Order 43; dismissal would allow evasion	Doctrine inapplicable where cessation is tied to changed public-health facts and termination of the emergency; mere power to reissue orders is insufficient	Voluntary-cessation inapplicable here — termination of emergency and factual context make recurrence speculative; dismissal affirmed

Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85 (U.S. 2013) (defendants cannot moot a case by temporary changes that defeat review)
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (U.S. 2000) (voluntary-cessation standard: must be "absolutely clear" that wrongful conduct cannot recur)
Town of Portsmouth v. Lewis, 813 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2016) (explaining mootness for injunctive and declaratory relief and voluntary-cessation analysis)
Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294 (U.S. 2021) (voluntary cessation of COVID restrictions does not automatically moot cases)
Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (U.S. 2020) (challenge not moot where restrictions remained and could be reimposed)
Bayley’s Campground, Inc. v. Mills, 985 F.3d 153 (1st Cir. 2021) (rescission did not moot challenge where recurrence was reasonably expected)
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. City of N.Y., 140 S. Ct. 1525 (U.S. 2020) (challenge mooted where defendant provided plaintiffs the precise relief sought)
N.E. Reg'l Council of Carpenters v. Kinton, 284 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2002) (repeal of regulation typically moots challenge to that regulation)
Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Mass. v. U.S. Conf. of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2013) (discussing standards for declaratory relief and mootness)