225 So. 3d 20
Miss. Ct. App.2017Background
- Bostick and Poe own single-family houses in Blue Lake Springs subdivision (DeSoto County) and listed them for short-term rental on websites like HomeAway and Craigslist, marketing to transient guests.
- Neighbors complained of loud parties, out-of-state vehicles, and disruptive conduct at rentals; County alleged violation of A-R Overlay zoning permitting only "single family dwellings."
- County sought and obtained a preliminary and then a permanent injunction in chancery court barring Bostick and Poe from offering their homes as "vacation rentals."
- Chancery court found the rentals were "hotel-like" and not permitted; cases consolidated on appeal.
- The supreme court reviewed the issue de novo (pure question of law: zoning interpretation) and affirmed the injunction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Bostick/Poe) | Defendant's Argument (DeSoto County) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether short-term, successive rentals of a house are a permitted "single family dwelling" use in the A-R Overlay | A house is a "dwelling" if designed as a residence; renting short-term does not change its character as a single-family dwelling | Short-term rentals are offered to the public and open to transients, creating a "hotel-like" use excluded from the definition of "dwelling" and thus not a permitted single-family use | Affirmed: short-term rentals to transient guests are not a permitted use; injunction upheld |
| Whether the general "dwelling" definition controls or the specific "single family dwelling" definition controls | General definition permits a dwelling based on design; thus rentals should be allowed | Specific definition requires occupancy "by not more than one family," and successive transient occupants means more than one family occupies over time | Held: specific definition supports County—repeated transient occupancy inconsistent with "single family dwelling" |
| Whether County's interpretation is manifestly unreasonable (deference to local construction) | Appellants: County’s hotel classification is a strained construction and improperly expands ordinance | County: its interpretation is reasonable and entitled to great weight absent manifest unreasonableness | Held: County’s interpretation is not manifestly unreasonable; deference given and affirmed |
| Whether appellants can operate as bed-and-breakfasts or similar without conditional approval | Appellants implied that short-term rentals should be allowed without special permissions | County: bed-and-breakfast is a conditional use with preconditions (lot size, approval, limits on guest activity); allowing unregulated transient rentals would defeat those controls | Held: Conditional bed-and-breakfast rules indicate County intended to regulate transient lodging; unconditioned short-term rentals are not permitted |
Key Cases Cited
- McNeil v. Hester, 753 So.2d 1057 (Miss. 2000) (standard of review: factual findings deferential, legal questions de novo)
- City of Gulfport v. Daniels, 97 So.2d 218 (Miss. 1957) (zoning ordinances construed fairly and reasonably in light of terminology and purpose)
- Columbus & Greenville Ry. Co. v. Scales, 578 So.2d 275 (Miss. 1991) (give effect to intent of lawmaking body; local construction accorded great weight)
- Hall v. City of Ridgeland, 37 So.3d 25 (Miss. 2010) (deference to local authorities’ construction of ordinance unless manifestly unreasonable)
- Brown v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 957 P.2d 207 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (short-term residential leases do not necessarily transform a residence into a nonresidential use)
- Shvekh v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Stroud Township, 154 A.3d 408 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2017) (municipality may not adopt a strained new interpretation to prohibit vacation rentals absent ordinance amendment)