162 A.3d 170
D.C.2017Background
- Petitioner Nelson Bostic was convicted of forcible rape in 1982, served prison time, released on parole in 2000, and is required to register for life under D.C.’s Sex Offender Registration Act.
- Bostic applied for Section 8 housing assistance, was admitted in 2008 after a police clearance that only looked back six years, so his 1982 conviction did not appear.
- Federal law (QHWRA and HUD regulations) prohibits admission of households that include members subject to lifetime sex-offender registration; DCHA’s 2013 rule (14 DCMR § 5804.1(b)) mandates termination if any household member is subject to lifetime registration.
- In 2014 an audit revealed Bostic’s registrant status; DCHA initiated termination under its regulation; Bostic conceded his status but argued the DCHA regulation conflicted with federal law and that its application was retroactive.
- The DCHA hearing officer and Executive Director upheld termination; the court affirmed, holding federal law does not preempt DCHA’s termination under local regulation and declining to address Bostic’s unpreserved retroactivity claim on the merits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether federal law preempts DCHA’s local rule terminating lifetime sex-offender registrants admitted in error | Bostic: Federal statutes/regulations and HUD guidance show Congress/HUD intended PHAs cannot terminate such registrants; termination authority is limited and exclusive provisions don’t include registrant status | DCHA: Federal law prohibits admission but does not bar PHAs from correcting erroneous admissions; other federal provisions indicate eviction/termination is permitted or contemplated | Held: No preemption — federal law does not prevent DCHA from terminating Bostic under 14 DCMR § 5804.1(b) |
| Whether federal law itself requires PHAs to terminate lifetime registrants already admitted | Bostic: Federal scheme implies PHAs lack authority to terminate except where specified | DCHA: Even if federal law does not expressly require termination, it permits correction of unlawful admissions and eviction authority exists | Held: Court did not decide whether federal law requires termination; only held federal law does not preclude local termination |
| Whether owner/PHAs must continue benefits despite federal admission ban | Bostic: Once admitted, withdrawing benefits is disruptive and Congress/HUD likely intended to protect those already admitted | DCHA: Federal provisions (eviction/lease enforcement authority and owner rights) undermine notion of protected status for erroneous admissions | Held: Court found statutes/regulations support denying continued benefits to registrants admitted in error |
| Whether DCHA’s application of § 5804.1(b) to Bostic is impermissibly retroactive | Bostic: Regulation adopted after his admission; applying it now is retroactive and unfair | DCHA: Procedural default — claim was not properly raised before agency | Held: Court refused to consider retroactivity claim as forfeited for lack of timely administrative presentation; noted doubt that retroactivity would bar termination given the initial unlawful admission |
Key Cases Cited
- Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., 471 U.S. 707 (preemption principles)
- Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (conflict and field preemption framework)
- Murray v. Motorola, Inc., 982 A.2d 764 (D.C. 2009) (preemption analysis includes regulations)
- Zimbelman v. Southern Nevada Regional Housing Authority, 111 F. Supp. 3d 1148 (D. Nev. 2015) (upholding termination of tenant admitted then found to be registered sex-offender)
- Jemison v. National Baptist Convention, USA, Inc., 720 A.2d 275 (waiver/forfeiture of claims raised only on reconsideration)