Bosley v. A Bradley Hospitality LLC
1:25-cv-22336
| S.D. Fla. | Sep 18, 2025Background
- Plaintiff Bosley, a residential number on the Do Not Call Registry, received multiple telemarketing texts from Defendant Bradley Hospitality LLC.
- Plaintiff sent an opt-out message stating “No stop” but Defendant continued texting through March 2025.
- Plaintiff alleges no prior express written consent or existing business relationship with Defendant.
- Alleged injuries include invasion of privacy, annoyance, and related harms from repeated texts.
- Plaintiff asserts two TCPA counts: (1) violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) for solicitations to a number on the Do Not Call Registry; (2) violation of § 64.1200(d) for lacking do-not-call procedures and maintenance.
- Defendant moves to dismiss/strike, arguing lack of standing and failure to state a claim; Plaintiff opposes, asserting Article III standing and viable TCPA claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing under Article III for TCPA claims | Drazen controls: a single unwanted text can show injury in fact. | No concrete injury; texts were informational, not advertisements; no standing. | Plaintiff has standing; receipt of an unwanted text constitutes concrete injury. |
| Whether text messages violated § 64.1200(c) (solicitations to Do Not Call list) | Texts were telemarketing solicitations promoting the restaurant and services. | Messages were informational, not advertisements; no solicitation. | Allegations show telephone solicitations; § 64.1200(c) violation adequately pleaded. |
| Whether text messages violated § 64.1200(d) (do-not-call procedures) | Defendant failed to maintain a master opt-out list and ignore requests to stop. | Argues no valid consent/opt-out issue for counts; did not maintain do-not-call procedures. | Plaintiff adequately alleged § 64.1200(d) violation; lack of internal do-not-call policies sustained. |
| Effect of Plaintiff's 'No stop' responses on consent | ‘No stop’ is a valid revocation/request to cease; does not create ongoing consent. | ‘No stop’ implied consent to continue texting. | ‘No stop’ does not demonstrate consent; reasonable interpretation supports revocation and continued violation claim. |
Key Cases Cited
- Drazen v. Pinto, 74 F.4th 1336 (11th Cir. 2023) (standing exists from receipt of an unwanted text)
- Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153 (Sup. Ct. 2016) (text messages and TCPA framework; tests of standing and injury)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (S. Ct. 2016) (concrete injury requirement clarifications)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (S. Ct. 1992) (injury in fact concept foundational to standing)
- Legg v. Voice Media Grp., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 2d 1351 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (TCPA text messages have equal protection to calls; liberal consumer interpretation)