Boseman v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing
157 A.3d 10
| Pa. Commw. Ct. | 2017Background
- Officer Reynolds stopped Rachael Boseman after observing erratic driving and speeding; he detected alcohol odor, bloodshot/glassy eyes, slurred speech, failed field sobriety tests, and a positive portable breath test.
- Boseman was arrested for DUI, read the DL-26 implied-consent warnings in the patrol car, initially agreed to a blood test, then revoked consent before arrival at the hospital and said she would not give blood.
- At the police station Boseman signed the DL-26, asked about counsel, texted an attorney, and later asked to take the blood test but officers refused as they considered it "too late."
- Trial court credited officers’ testimony that Boseman refused chemical testing after being adequately warned and that no second meaningful offer to test was made at the station.
- Commonwealth Court affirmed, holding (1) officer had reasonable grounds for the DUI arrest and (2) Boseman’s conduct constituted a refusal under 75 Pa. C.S. §1547, so DOT’s 1-year administrative suspension was proper.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Boseman was given a meaningful opportunity to submit to a second chemical (blood) test at the station | Boseman: officers effectively offered a renewed opportunity at the station (incident report entry "still refused") and she was denied a meaningful chance to comply | DOT: trial court credited officers that no new offer was made after the patrol-car refusal; Boseman never expressed assent at the station | Court held the trial court’s credibility finding was supported by the record: no second meaningful offer was made; refusal stood |
| Whether Birchfield v. North Dakota requires suppression of the administrative suspension absent a warrant for a blood draw | Boseman: Birchfield forbids warrantless blood draws and, because Pennsylvania warns of enhanced criminal penalties, Birchfield invalidates applying §1547 without a warrant | DOT: Pennsylvania’s implied-consent suspension is a civil administrative remedy (refusal itself is not a separate crime); Birchfield did not invalidate civil implied-consent schemes imposing administrative penalties | Court held Birchfield does not alter the civil suspension framework here; Birchfield addressed criminal penalties for refusal and did not cast doubt on civil implied-consent suspensions |
Key Cases Cited
- Walkden v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 103 A.3d 431 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (sets elements and standard for §1547 administrative suspension)
- Scott v. Dep’t of Transp., 684 A.2d 539 (Pa. 1996) (officer satisfies duty by informing motorist of implied-consent warnings; subjective misunderstanding not dispositive)
- Bashore v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 27 A.3d 272 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (administrative license-suspension proceeding is separate from criminal DUI proceedings)
- Quigley v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 965 A.2d 349 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (reading DL-26 sufficiently apprises driver of suspension consequences)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) (metabolization of alcohol does not create a per se exigency for warrantless blood draws)
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (warrantless blood draws are not permissible incident to arrest absent consent or exigency; upheld warrantless breath testing; clarified scope regarding criminal refusal statutes)