Borough of New Bloomfield v. Wagner
2012 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 29
| Pa. Commw. Ct. | 2012Background
- Property Owners store multiple unregistered, uninspected, or untitled vehicles on properties within Bloomfield Borough (New Bloomfield) and are subject to Ordinance No. 256, which bans abandoned or junked vehicles and authorizes removal by the Borough.
- Ordinance No. 256 treats certain abandoned vehicles as nuisances per se, defining abandoned vehicles and providing for removal even without proof of actual nuisance in fact.
- Borough filed declaratory judgment seeking to apply the ordinance to Property Owners and compel removal; Property Owners answered, asserting ultra vires and unconstitutionality as applied.
- Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed; trial court granted the Borough’s motion and held the ordinance constitutional as applied, relying on a nuisance-in-fact showing and not treating abandonment per se as a nuisance.
- On appeal, the Commonwealth Court reverses, holding the ordinance unconstitutional as applied because it declares storage of certain vehicles as a nuisance per se and there was insufficient evidence of a nuisance in fact from the stipulation.
- Remand for entry of summary judgment in favor of Property Owners.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is Ordinance No. 256 ultra vires as applied to Property Owners? | Wagner/Hench argue it declares abandonment per se a nuisance, exceeding power. | Borough contends it regulates nuisances under Borough Code §1202(5) and is valid. | Yes; ordinance is ultra vires as applied. |
| Is Ordinance No. 256 constitutional as applied to Property Owners? | Ordinance improperly expands power and targets private property without proof of nuisance in fact. | Ordinance aligns with health, safety, welfare goals and similar prior decisions. | No; unconstitutional as applied. |
| Was there evidence of a nuisance in fact to sustain enforcement? | Stipulation shows vehicles in plain view but no proven public nuisance. | Evidence of plain-view vehicles and nearby residences supports nuisance in fact. | No; record did not establish nuisance in fact. |
| Should the trial court’s ruling be affirmed or reversed? | The trial court properly applied reasonable interpretation of the ordinance. | The trial court erred in finding burden of proof satisfied. | Reversed; remanded for summary judgment for Property Owners. |
Key Cases Cited
- Teal v. Township of Haverford, 134 Pa. Cmwlth. 157 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990) (no nuisance in fact shown where no public danger or impact proven)
- Kadash v. City of Williamsport, 340 A.2d 617 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1975) (save-a-constitutionality where reasonable interpretation exists)
- Talley v. Borough of Trainer, 394 A.2d 645 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1978) (nuisance in fact requires conditions imposing public hazard)
- Hanzlik v. Commonwealth, 161 A.2d 340 (Pa. 1960) (no nuisance in fact without evidence of public harm)
- Creighton v. Commonwealth, 639 A.2d 1299 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (ordinance must affirmatively establish nuisance in fact)
- Davis v. Commonwealth, 561 A.2d 1339 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989) (nuisance in fact must be proven to sustain ordinance violation)
- Groff v. Commonwealth, 514 A.2d 300 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986) (ordinance presumptively valid; challengers bear burden of showing lack of public health relation)
- Hanzlik v. Commonwealth, 400 Pa. 134 (Pa. 1960) (reaffirms need for evidence of nuisance in fact)