Borgman v. Kedley
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14729
| 8th Cir. | 2011Background
- Borgman voluntarily self-excluded from a Mississippi Belle riverboat casino in 2002 under Iowa regulation requiring lifetime exclusion and non-entry procedures.
- In 2005 Borgman signed a new self-exclusion form at Mississippi Belle; the form warned of trespass penalties and included a broad release for the casino and assigns.
- Mississippi Belle assets and liabilities were acquired by Wild Rose Clinton, L.L.C. in 2006; Wild Rose reopened on land as Wild Rose Casino in 2008.
- Wild Rose created a problem-gamblers list and procedures in 2008; the exclusion list did not yet include Borgman when she earlier cashed checks in August 2008.
- On September 26, 2008 Borgman tried to cash a check; security identified her from the Mississippi Belle exclusions and contacted Kedley, an Iowa CID agent stationed at the casino.
- Kedley arrested Borgman for trespass after she refused to sign a readvisement form; charge was dismissed; Borgman sued Kedley and Wild Rose under §1983 and state claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Kedley is protected by qualified immunity | Borgman argues no qualified immunity due to falsity of arrest and lack of probable cause. | Kedley contends there was arguable probable cause to arrest for trespass based on self-exclusion and information from casino security. | Yes; Kedley entitled to qualified immunity; arguable probable cause existed. |
| Whether there was arguable probable cause to arrest Borgman for trespass | Borgman asserts no trespass since exclusion forms did not clearly apply and she did not knowingly violate the law. | Kedley relied on casino security’s representation that Borgman had signed exclusion forms applicable to Wild Rose and that she knew she was barred. | Yes; a reasonable officer could construe the exclusion as applying and arrest for trespass was supported by arguable probable cause. |
| Whether Kedley’s subjective motive affects qualified immunity | Borgman argues arrest was motivated by coercion to sign readvisement, not trespass. | Motivation is irrelevant to qualified immunity; objective reasonableness governs the analysis. | Held Kedley’s motive is irrelevant; qualified immunity remains if arguable probable cause existed. |
| Whether the 2005 release barred Borgman’s claims against Wild Rose | Borgman argues the release was invalid due to coercion, lack of consideration, and non-read; it cannot bar claims. | Release was valid, supported by consideration (jackpot) and enforceable against assigns like Wild Rose; estoppel does not apply. | Yes; the release valid and enforceable; Wild Rose not liable on claims. |
Key Cases Cited
- Amrine v. Brooks, 522 F.3d 823 (8th Cir.2008) (defense allows qualified immunity if reasonable belief of no clearly established rights)
- Fisher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 619 F.3d 811 (8th Cir.2010) (arguable probable cause and reliance on information from victims/or informants)
- Krause v. Bennett, 887 F.2d 362 (2d Cir.1989) (use of information available to determine state of mind in arrests)
- Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646 (8th Cir.1999) (need for minimal further investigation if exculpatory evidence exists)
- Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (U.S.1981) (constitutional rights depend on reasonableness; subjective intent is not controlling)
- McCabe v. Parker, 608 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir.2010) (subjective motivation irrelevant to qualified immunity analysis)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (U.S.2001) (two-part test for qualified immunity; court may address first prong or second)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (U.S.2009) (clarified that court may decide which qualified-immunity element to address first)