Borden Dairy Co. of Alabama v. Kuhajda
171 So. 3d 242
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- Susanne Kuhajda sued Borden Dairy Company of Alabama, LLC and Major O. Greenrock for negligence and prevailed at trial; jury awarded damages exceeding Kuhajda’s offers of judgment.
- Kuhajda served identical lump-sum offers of judgment to both defendants stating the offers included “costs, interest, and all damages or monies recoverable under the complaint and by law.”
- Defendants argued the offers were fatally deficient because they did not state whether attorneys’ fees were included or whether attorneys’ fees were part of the legal claim, as required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(2)(F).
- The trial court awarded Kuhajda attorneys’ fees and costs under section 768.79, Florida Statutes and rule 1.442, concluding the omission did not create ambiguity because Kuhajda had not sought attorneys’ fees in her complaint.
- The district court reviewed the fee award de novo and reversed, holding the offers failed to strictly comply with rule 1.442(c)(2)(F).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an offer of judgment must state whether it includes attorneys’ fees and whether attorneys’ fees are part of the legal claim under rule 1.442(c)(2)(F) | Kuhajda’s offer was valid as written; omission irrelevant because she did not seek fees in the complaint | Offer invalid for failing to state if attorneys’ fees were included or part of the legal claim as rule 1.442 requires | Offers failed strict compliance with rule 1.442(c)(2)(F); fee award reversed |
| Whether strict compliance applies even when fees were not pleaded | The rule should not defeat a fee award where the complaint did not request fees | Rule requires strict, mandatory language regardless of whether fees were pleaded | Strict compliance required regardless; omission fatal to fee award |
| Applicability of precedent requiring strict construction of offers of judgment | Kuhajda argued ambiguity test should control | Defendants relied on strict-compliance precedent | Court followed supreme court precedent enforcing strict compliance with offer-of-judgment rules |
| Whether this decision conflicts with Fourth DCA precedent (Bennett) | N/A | Bennett allowed similar offers despite omission | Court certified conflict with Bennett and reversed |
Key Cases Cited
- Paduru v. Klinkenberg, 157 So.3d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (standard of review for fee-award motion is de novo)
- Campbell v. Goldman, 959 So.2d 223 (Fla. 2007) (offers/statute must be strictly construed)
- Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So.2d 276 (Fla. 2003) (strict compliance with rule 1.442 requirements for joint proposals)
- Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Horowitch, 107 So.3d 362 (Fla. 2013) (an offer failing to state inclusion of attorneys’ fees does not meet rule 1.442(c)(2)(F))
- R.J. Reynolds Tobacco v. Ward, 141 So.3d 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (strict-compliance test, not absence-of-ambiguity, governs rule 1.442)
- Bennett v. American Learning Systems of Boca Delray, Inc., 857 So.2d 986 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (contrasting decision; court certified conflict)