Booth v. Kelley, 5:15-cv-00295

Background

Derrick Lamont Booth was convicted by a Pulaski County jury of arson for a house fire on October 5, 2012; he filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging trial counsel’s performance.
The central prosecution evidence was Fire Marshal Ryan Baker’s expert testimony that the fire was incendiary and that Booth was a developed suspect (based on physical inspection, interviews, text messages, and lab results showing no ignitable liquids).
Defense counsel cross-examined Baker but did not retain or call a fire‑investigation expert, did not object to Baker’s qualifications, and did not press NFPA 921 methodology challenges at trial.
On habeas review, the magistrate judge (applying the Martinez/Trevino framework) held an evidentiary hearing; petitioner presented expert Robert Bieber criticizing Baker’s conclusion‑about‑ignition (arguing Baker relied on ‘‘negative corpus’’ and went beyond empirical evidence).
Trial counsel (former judge Marion Humphrey) testified that his strategy was to attack the incendiary determination on common‑sense grounds and to avoid overly attacking a fire department witness; he acknowledged he did not consult an expert and conceded that might have been a mistake.
The magistrate judge recommended denying the writ: Baker was qualified as an expert, his methodology was reliable enough that challenges went to weight not admissibility, and Booth failed to show prejudice under Strickland even if counsel’s performance had been deficient. A certificate of appealability was recommended on the narrow issue of whether counsel’s failure to challenge Baker’s statement that he developed Booth as a suspect was ineffective assistance.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Booth)	Defendant's Argument (State/Humphrey)	Held
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach/challenge Baker’s qualifications	Baker lacked sufficient qualifications to opine and should have been impeached	Baker had relevant experience, training, and 178 investigations—sufficient to qualify; challenge would go to weight	Denied — Baker was sufficiently qualified; failure to object not shown to be prejudicial
Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge Baker’s methodology (use or non‑use of NFPA 921 / reliance on negative corpus)	Baker deviated from NFPA 921 and relied on ‘‘negative corpus’’ to infer an open‑flame ignition without empirical support	NFPA 921 is not the exclusive standard; Baker’s methods (scene exam, patterns, interviews, lab report) were reliable and methodological flaws go to credibility	Denied — methodology issues affect weight not admissibility; no Strickland prejudice shown
Whether counsel was ineffective for not retaining/using a defense fire expert	An expert would have exposed methodological flaws and contradicted incendiary conclusion	Strategic choice to avoid confusing jury or bolstering prosecution expert; cross‑examination already elicited concessions	Denied — strategic choice was reasonable and, even if deficient, petitioner failed to show a substantial likelihood of a different outcome
Whether counsel’s failure to object to Baker saying he developed Booth as a suspect was prejudicial	That testimony improperly suggested guilt and counsel should have objected	Baker did not state guilt, only that he developed a suspect based on investigation; jury decides guilt; any objection likely unsuccessful	Close — court found reasonable minds could differ; COA recommended on this issue, but writ denied on merits for lack of prejudice

Key Cases Cited

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (procedural default doctrine)
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) (limited exception to Coleman for inadequate post‑conviction counsel)
Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013) (clarifying Martinez four‑prong test)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑part ineffective assistance standard)
Marmo v. Tyson Fresh Meats, 457 F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 2006) (resolving doubts on expert usefulness in favor of admissibility)
Manuel v. MDOW Ins. Co., 791 F.3d 838 (8th Cir. 2015) (NFPA 921 is a reliable method but not the only acceptable methodology)
Hickerson v. Pride Mobility Prods. Corp., 470 F.3d 1252 (8th Cir. 2006) (process‑of‑elimination origin-and-cause testimony permissible)
Brandt Distrib. Co. v. Federal Ins. Co., 247 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 2001) (expert may classify fire as incendiary without opining as to who caused it)