Booth v. Hackney Acquisition Co.Â
256 N.C. App. 181
| N.C. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Henry Hunter Booth worked for Hackney from 1967–1989; insured by Home Insurance Co. (insolvent) from 1988–1990. Home was liquidated by a New Hampshire court on June 13, 2003, which set a claims bar date of June 13, 2004.
- Booth was diagnosed with lung cancer on June 23, 2008 and died April 27, 2009; treating physician linked disease to occupational welding exposures.
- Plaintiff (Booth’s widow/administratrix) filed a North Carolina Form 18 on December 1, 2009. NC Insurance Guaranty Ass’n (NCIGA), stepping in for insolvent Home, denied coverage under N.C.G.S. § 58-48-35(a)(1) (bar date) and § 58-48-100(a) (five‑year statute of repose).
- NCIGA moved to dismiss based on the bar date and the statute of repose; Deputy Commissioner denied the motion; Full Commission certified the constitutional question to the Court of Appeals under N.C.G.S. § 97-86.
- Certified question: whether the bar date and the five‑year statute of repose, as applied to latent occupational diseases that develop years after exposure, violate due process or equal protection under the North Carolina or U.S. Constitutions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether N.C.G.S. § 58-48-35(a)(1) (bar date) violates equal protection or due process | Bar date denies claimants whose latent disease manifests after the bar date access to NCIGA remedies and thus infringes rights | Bar date is a legitimate, reasonable legislative means to protect NCIGA solvency, preserve insolvent estate assets, promote uniform national practice, and limit public fiscal burden | Court held bar date survives minimum scrutiny; does not violate equal protection or due process |
| Whether N.C.G.S. § 58-48-100(a) (five-year statute of repose) is unconstitutional or deviates from Workers’ Comp purposes | Statute of repose bars latent-disease claimants whose disease manifested after repose period, undermining Act’s purposes and claimant rights | Statute of repose is a substantive, legislatively permissible limitation that furthers legitimate state interests in finality, fund integrity, and fiscal planning | Court held statute of repose constitutional under minimum scrutiny; does not violate state or federal constitutions |
| Whether the Court should apply strict or minimum scrutiny | Plaintiff urged strict scrutiny (fundamental right to remedies) | NCIGA and Court: no fundamental right or suspect class implicated; apply minimum/rational-basis review | Court applied minimum scrutiny (rational-basis) and upheld the statutes |
| Whether the Court should decide if the statute of repose deviates from the Act's purposes in this interlocutory posture | Plaintiff asked Court to address deviation from Act’s purposes | Court limited review to constitutional question certified by Commission | Court declined to decide deviation-from-purpose issue on interlocutory appeal; remanded for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Piedmont Triad Reg'l Water Auth. v. Sumner Hills Inc., 353 N.C. 343 (de novo review when constitutional rights implicated)
- Payne v. Charlotte Heating & Air Conditioning, 172 N.C. App. 496 (equal protection standard and treatment of latent disease distinctions)
- McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (rational-basis rationale for upholding legislative classifications)
- Roberts v. Durham Cty. Hosp. Corp., 56 N.C. App. 533 (equal protection analysis and standards)
- Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419 (presumption of constitutionality for statutes and discussion of statutes of repose)
- Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160 (legislative power to enact statutes of repose subject to constitutional limits)
- Wilder v. Amatex Corp., 314 N.C. 550 (analysis of statute of repose coverage for disease claims; distinguished here because Wilder did not raise a constitutional challenge)