Boone v. Boone
2016 Ky. App. LEXIS 178
| Ky. | 2016Background
- Megan and Hezekiah Boone married in 2004; three children resulted. Megan filed for divorce in Oct 2014 and multiple domestic violence (DVO) petitions between Nov 2014 and July 2015.
- An Emergency Protective Order (EPO) was entered Nov 21, 2014, restraining Hezekiah and excluding him from the home and certain locations; he was served and later arrested for violating the EPO.
- Parties entered an Agreed Restraining Order after mediation in Jan 2015; Megan later filed additional DVO petitions alleging stalking, trespass, voyeuristic videos taken from Hezekiah’s phone, and surveillance photos showing him outside her home.
- A family court judge (Judge Brown) presided over the DVO hearings; after the July 2015 hearing she recused from the divorce case based on an ex parte communication but did not immediately recuse from the separate DVO proceeding and later dismissed the third DVO.
- Megan moved to disqualify Judge Brown from the DVO proceeding and to vacate the dismissal; the judge denied the motion, reasoning the recusal in the divorce case did not require disqualification in the DVO case.
- The Court of Appeals vacated the DVO dismissal and the denial-of-disqualification order, holding that recusal in the divorce case automatically required disqualification in the related family-court DVO matter and remanded for reassignment and a written findings-based ruling on the existing record.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Judge Brown’s recusal in the divorce action required disqualification from the related DVO proceeding | Recusal in the divorce case created an appearance problem in the related family-court DVO; one-family/one-judge principle mandates disqualification across related family matters | Megan should have objected earlier; recusal based on an ex parte communication applied only to the divorce case and not the separate DVO docket | Held: Recusal from the divorce action automatically disqualified the judge from the DVO; orders entered after recusal are void and case must be reassigned |
| Whether the DVO dismissal was correct on the merits under the domestic violence statute then in effect | Alleged conduct (stalking, trespass, voyeuristic videos, surveillance, EPO violations) could be reasonably inferred to cause fear of imminent physical injury and thus fit within the domestic violence statute and its liberal construction | Court below: stalking and voyeurism were not defined as domestic violence under the statute in effect at that time, so petitioner failed to prove domestic violence by preponderance | Court did not decide merits; noted prior liberal constructions and statutory amendment but remanded for reassignment and written findings based on the record |
| Whether the trial court misapplied KRS 403.720(1) (definition of domestic violence) | Statutory language and precedent permit construing fear-causing conduct (including stalking-related acts) as domestic violence prior to the 2016 amendment | Trial court treated stalking/voyeurism as outside domestic violence scope pre-amendment | Court observed possible misapplication of the statute and precedent favoring broad, victim-protective construction; directed reassignment and findings |
| Appropriate remedy for judge acting after disqualification | Orders issued after voluntary disqualification are void; remand for reassignment and fresh ruling | Judge’s orders should stand because recusal related only to divorce docket | Held: Orders were void; vacated and case remanded to same division as divorce for written findings on existing record |
Key Cases Cited
- Wedding v. Lair, 404 S.W.2d 451 (Ky. 1966) (voluntary disqualification by a judge defeats jurisdiction and renders subsequent orders void)
- Keifer v. Keifer, 354 S.W.3d 123 (Ky. 2011) (requirement that family-court orders include written factual findings)
- Bonne v. Boone, 463 S.W.3d 767 (Ky. App. 2015) (Keifer findings requirement applies to domestic violence orders)
- Appalachian Regional Healthcare, Inc. v. Coleman, 239 S.W.3d 49 (Ky. 2007) (recused judge lacks jurisdiction to enter substantive rulings)
- Wallace v. Wallace, 224 S.W.3d 587 (Ky. App. 2007) (family court’s one-family/one-judge purpose; consolidation of family litigation)
- B.C. v. B.T., 182 S.W.3d 213 (Ky. App. 2005) (family court is a division of circuit court with general jurisdiction; clarifies family-court role)
- Hohman v. Dery, 371 S.W.3d 780 (Ky. App. 2012) (courts may infer fear of imminent physical injury from non-physical acts and construe domestic-violence statutes liberally)
- Crabtree v. Crabtree, 484 S.W.3d 316 (Ky. App. 2016) (domestic-violence protection can encompass psychological terrorizing conduct)
- Beckord v. District Court, 698 P.2d 1323 (Colo. 1985) (recusal in consolidated/multi-docket litigation disqualifies judge from all related matters)
- Lynch v. Lynch, 737 S.W.2d 184 (Ky. App. 1987) (when a complete record exists, additional testimony on remand may be unnecessary)