Boone Cnty. Republican Party v. H. David Wallace, 132 F.4th 406

Background

Three Kentucky Republican Party county executive committees (Boone, Hardin, Jessamine) challenged the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance’s (the "Registry") requirement that they register as a "political issues committee" to expend funds supporting a state constitutional amendment on the 2024 ballot.
The Registry issued an advisory opinion stating executive committees could not spend funds raised for party nominees to support ballot amendments; to do so, members would need to form a separate political issues committee.
Plaintiffs argued this requirement chilled their political speech and violated their First Amendment rights, as it prevented them from advocating for both party candidates and ballot amendments using the same entity and funds.
The district court denied plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction, reasoning the registration requirement was minimally burdensome and justified by governmental interests in disclosure and transparency.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit initially granted an injunction pending appeal but, after full briefing and argument, affirmed the district court’s denial, holding the requirement amounted to a disclosure regime, not a ban on speech.
One judge dissented, arguing the requirement was a content- and speaker-based restriction on core political speech in violation of the First Amendment.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is requiring executive committees to register as a political issues committee before spending on ballot initiatives a ban on speech or a disclosure requirement?	It is a ban on political speech, as it forces parties to form a new entity and prohibits combined advocacy for candidates and issues; violates Citizens United.	It is a disclosure requirement, not a speech ban; entities may still advocate on ballot issues with appropriate disclosure.	Disclosure requirement; does not ban speech.
Does the requirement unconstitutionally burden First Amendment rights?	Yes; political speech and expenditure is highly protected; alternative means (new entity) do not mitigate the burden.	No; disclosure facilitates transparency, and the burden is justified and minimal for sophisticated actors like party committees.	No constitutional violation; registration is narrowly tailored.
Is the regime content- or speaker-based discrimination?	Yes; restricts speech based on content (ballot measures vs. candidate advocacy) and by speaker (party committee vs. other groups).	No; any group that wishes to advocate on ballot issues must comply equally; not based on identity or viewpoint.	Not discriminatory; regime applies uniformly.
What standard of scrutiny applies and is it satisfied?	Strict scrutiny is required for content/speaker-based restrictions; not met here.	Exacting scrutiny for disclosure laws; state’s transparency interest is substantial and the means are narrowly tailored.	Exacting scrutiny applies; regime survives review.

Key Cases Cited

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (ban on corporate spending for political speech unconstitutional; disclosure permissible, but outright suppression not allowed)
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (disclosure requirements for campaign finance permissible under exacting scrutiny)
Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989) (recognizing core First Amendment protections for party committees)
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (state cannot ban corporations from speaking on ballot measures)
Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (weight of organizational burdens in campaign finance on First Amendment activity)
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185 (2014) (disclosure and contribution limits reviewed under different levels of scrutiny)
Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) (political committees’ right to associate and spend on ballot measures)