116 F.4th 586
6th Cir.2024Background
- Three Kentucky Republican Party county executive committees (Boone, Hardin, Jessamine) challenged the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance's rule prohibiting them from spending funds to support a state constitutional amendment appearing on the November 2024 ballot.
- The Registry interpreted Kentucky’s campaign finance regulations to require a separate "political issues committee" for any group or committee wishing to expend funds on ballot measures, limiting executive committees to supporting party nominees only.
- The executive committees argued that the Registry’s interpretation prevented them from distributing campaign materials that supported both Republican candidates and the constitutional amendment (Amendment 2, relating to school choice).
- The district court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction, finding the burden on the committees’ First Amendment rights to be minimal and justified by disclosure interests.
- On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reviewed whether an injunction pending appeal was warranted, examining likelihood of success, potential irreparable harm, and the First Amendment implications.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Can executive committees expend funds supporting a ballot amendment as protected speech? | The committees have a First Amendment right to speak on ballot questions as part of their core political activities. | Only separate political issues committees can speak on ballot measures under Kentucky law. | Yes; Registry’s restriction likely violates First Amendment rights. |
| Do requirements to form a separate committee burden constitutional rights? | Forcing separate committees unnecessarily burdens party committees’ speech & association rights. | The burden is minimal—just disclosure and a separate account, justified by transparency. | Even minimal burdens on political committee speech are impermissible. |
| Is the Registry’s action a permissible disclosure regime or an impermissible speech restriction? | The rule is not merely disclosure—it's a prohibition on speech by executive committees. | It’s about enforcing disclosure; executive committees can speak by forming issues committees. | It is a speech restriction, not merely a disclosure regime. |
| Does the state’s interest in transparency justify this restriction? | Less restrictive disclosure rules could advance transparency without prohibiting speech. | Disclosure for political issues committees is important and more robust than for executive committees. | Restriction is not narrowly tailored and fails strict scrutiny. |
Key Cases Cited
- Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (statutes barring corporate campaign advocacy violate the First Amendment; alternative means of speech do not alleviate the restriction)
- Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (discussing protection for group political advocacy under the First Amendment)
- Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, 489 U.S. 214 (First Amendment protects political parties’ expression)
- Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (requirements to create separate entities to speak impose significant First Amendment burdens)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing requirements for federal court jurisdiction)
- Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (pre-enforcement First Amendment challenges require credible threat of enforcement)