Bonnie Peltier v. Charter Day School, Inc., 8 F.4th 251

Background

Charter Day School (CDS) is a nonprofit corporation operating a North Carolina charter K–8 school under a state charter; The Roger Bacon Academy (RBA), a for‑profit manager, handles day‑to‑day operations under a management contract.
CDS’s uniform policy requires boys to wear pants/shorts but requires girls to wear skirts, jumpers, or skorts (with some exceptions for gym days and special events).
Three female students (through parents) sued CDS and RBA alleging sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause (§ 1983) and Title IX; after discovery both sides moved for summary judgment.
The district court held CDS was a state actor and granted plaintiffs summary judgment on the § 1983 claim, but held Title IX did not reach sex‑specific dress codes and granted defendants summary judgment on Title IX; it entered partial final judgment enjoining the skirt rule.
The Fourth Circuit reversed the § 1983 ruling (holding CDS/RBA not state actors for the skirt rule), held that Title IX does cover sex‑based dress codes and that RBA is a Title IX recipient, and remanded for the district court to apply the proper Title IX standards.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Are CDS and RBA state actors for § 1983 purposes?	CDS is a state actor because charter schools are designated public, receive public funding, and perform a public educational function.	CDS/RBA are private operators; North Carolina’s charter scheme is deliberately hands‑off and does not make private actions fairly attributable to the State.	Reversed: CDS and RBA are not state actors for the skirt requirement; conduct not fairly attributable to the State.
Is RBA a "recipient" under Title IX?	RBA receives federal funds through CDS and operates the school, so it qualifies as a recipient under the Department’s recipient definition.	Mere indirect benefit from federal funds is insufficient to make RBA a Title IX recipient.	RBA is a Title IX recipient under the applicable regulatory definition.
Does Title IX cover sex‑specific dress codes (or are they categorically excluded by the DOE’s rescission)?	Title IX’s broad prohibition on sex discrimination applies to dress codes; rescission of the agency rule does not create a statutory exclusion.	The Department of Education rescinded its appearance‑code regulation; that and the statute’s silence support excluding dress codes from Title IX.	Title IX covers sex‑based dress codes; the statute’s text is broad and unambiguous on this point, so agency rescission does not preclude coverage.
What standard governs a dress‑code Title IX claim?	Apply Title IX’s text: ask whether plaintiffs were excluded from participation, denied benefits, or subjected to discrimination (individualized inquiry).	Assess the uniform policy as a whole and compare aggregate burdens across sexes (à la Jespersen).	Adopt an individualized inquiry: evaluate exclusion/denial of benefits or whether plaintiffs were treated worse than similarly situated peers; harm must be objective and sex must be a but‑for cause.

Key Cases Cited

Rendell‑Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (private school largely publicly funded not state actor for employee discharge)
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Schs. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001) (state action when private entity is pervasively entwined with public institutions)
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) (state may be liable when it delegates a constitutional obligation to a private actor)
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (state action requires close nexus between State and challenged action)
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (state coercion or significant encouragement necessary to attribute private conduct to the State)
Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2010) (charter school operator not a state actor for employment decisions)
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (discrimination analysis focuses on individuals and requires but‑for causation)
Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586 (4th Cir. 2020) (Title IX inquiry considers whether individual was treated worse than similarly situated peers)
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459 (1999) (indirect benefit from federal funds is not necessarily sufficient to make an entity a Title IX recipient)
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (Title VII appearance‑policy case comparing overall burdens across sexes)