37 F.4th 104
4th Cir.2022Background
- Charter Day School (CDS), a North Carolina public charter school operated by a nonprofit board, requires girls to wear skirts (the "skirts requirement"); Roger Bacon Academy (RBA) is a for‑profit manager under contract with CDS. CDS receives ~95% public funding.
- CDS’s founder described the skirts rule as promoting "chivalry" and treating girls as "fragile vessels," and the policy was integrated into the school’s educational philosophy. Parents sued on behalf of female students alleging Equal Protection and Title IX violations.
- The district court held CDS a state actor and granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on the Equal Protection claim, found RBA not a state actor, and held that dress codes categorically fall outside Title IX. Parties cross‑appealed.
- The Fourth Circuit en banc (majority) affirmed summary judgment for plaintiffs on Equal Protection against CDS, affirmed dismissal of Equal Protection as to RBA, and vacated the Title IX dismissal, remanding for further proceedings.
- The court applied the state‑action tests considering North Carolina law designating charter schools as public, the statutory scheme delegating public education to charter schools, and the character of the challenged conduct (dress code as part of the school’s core educational mission).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CDS is a state actor for § 1983 / Equal Protection | CDS is a state actor because North Carolina delegated part of its constitutional duty to provide free public education to charter schools; CDS performs a traditionally exclusive public function and is clothed with state authority. | CDS is a private actor providing educational services under contract; designation/funding alone do not convert it to a state actor (Rendell‑Baker line). | CDS is a state actor: NC law treats charter schools as public, CDS performs a function traditionally and exclusively reserved to the state, so its conduct is attributable to the state. |
| Whether RBA (management company) is a state actor | RBA’s daily operation and enforcement of the skirts rule make it effectively state‑controlled and thus a state actor. | RBA is a for‑profit contractor with no charter or direct state delegation; its actions are attenuated and not fairly attributable to the state. | RBA is not a state actor: its relationship is contractual with CDS (not the State), and North Carolina did not delegate its constitutional duty to for‑profit managers. |
| Whether the skirts requirement violates Equal Protection (merits) | The skirts rule is a sex‑based classification rooted in gender stereotypes that harms girls’ participation and dignity; it cannot survive heightened (intermediate) scrutiny. | The overall dress code imposes comparable burdens on boys (different but comparable restrictions); school goals (discipline, order) justify the code. | Skirts requirement fails intermediate scrutiny: justification rests on impermissible gender stereotypes (no "exceedingly persuasive" important governmental interest). Summary judgment for plaintiffs on Equal Protection against CDS affirmed. |
| Whether Title IX covers sex‑based dress codes and whether RBA is a Title IX recipient | Title IX’s ban on sex discrimination in federally funded education programs unambiguously covers sex‑based dress codes; RBA receives federal funds indirectly through CDS and thus is a recipient. | Department of Education rescinded an earlier regulation on appearance codes; Title IX is ambiguous here and agency interpretation favors noncoverage; RBA argues it does not directly receive federal funds. | Title IX unambiguously covers sex‑based dress codes imposed by covered entities; RBA is a recipient because it receives federal assistance through an intermediary. The district court’s grant for defendants on Title IX is vacated and remanded for merits/ev identiary proceedings. |
Key Cases Cited
- West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) (private contractor performing a constitutionally required state function may be a state actor)
- Rendell‑Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (extensive funding/regulation does not automatically create state action; look to whether function is traditionally exclusive to government)
- Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001) (state action analysis is fact‑specific; no single criterion is dispositive)
- United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (sex‑based classifications require an "exceedingly persuasive justification" under heightened scrutiny)
- NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459 (1999) (entities receiving federal assistance through an intermediary are recipients under statutes like Title IX)
- Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (Title IX is a broad prohibition with specific, narrow exceptions)