Bonnie Hargis v. Access Capital Funding, LLC
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 4474
| 8th Cir. | 2012Background
- Hargis sued Webster Bank and Access Capital Funding in Missouri state court on behalf of a putative class alleging unauthorized practice of law and MMPA violations related to loan-refinance fees.
- Webster refinanced Hargis’s home in 2007 via a broker (Access) because Webster lacked Missouri retail presence.
- At closing, escrow funded a new loan of $170,672 plus $2,500 cash from Hargis; funds paid off old mortgages, taxes, debt, and settlement charges.
- Access received a yield spread premium (YSP) from Webster; part of the YSP funded a $200 Access processing fee and $450 Webster administration fee.
- Hargis claimed the $200 processing fee and $450 administration fee were fees for preparing legal documents (unauthorized practice of law).
- The district court denied remand and later granted summary judgment for Defendants; it held Hargis lacked standing because she did not pay the contested fees (directly or indirectly).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CAFA removal was proper given class allegations | Hargis’s class was Missouri-only; CAFA threshold not satisfied | Original complaint contemplated nationwide class; CAFA threshold satisfied | Removal proper; CAFA threshold satisfied by nationwide class in original complaint |
| Whether Hargis has Article III standing | Hargis suffered injury-in-fact by paying fees | No injury; fees not paid by Hargis or linked to her payments | No standing; injury-in-fact not shown |
| Direct payment theory of injury | Hargis directly paid the processing/administration fees | Funds traceable to other disbursements; no direct payment by Hargis | No direct payment; no injury from direct payment theory |
| Indirect payment theory via higher interest rate (YSP) | Higher 6.75% rate than par rate reflected fees for legal services | No evidence that par rate was available or that fees affected rate; no linkage shown | No injury; no link between fees and rate; no standing |
Key Cases Cited
- Westerfeld v. Indep. Processing, LLC, 621 F.3d 819 (8th Cir. 2010) (CAFA removal; nationwide class favored for removal when pleaded)
- Bell v. Hershey Co., 557 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2009) (preponderance standard for CAFA jurisdiction; ability to stipulate otherwise)
- Schubert v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 649 F.3d 817 (8th Cir. 2011) (jurisdictional facts determined at removal; post-removal events cannot defeat jurisdiction)
- De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404 (5th Cir. 1995) (binding stipulation can defeat CAFA jurisdiction if filed before removal)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires injury, causation, and redressability)
- Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 2006) (standing burden at summary judgment; evidence required)