Bonney v. Wilson, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 11022

Background

Petitioner Steven Bonney was charged in Wyoming with four counts of second-degree sexual assault and one count of third-degree sexual assault for acts involving young victims; he pled guilty to two second-degree counts under a plea agreement.
A recantation letter from a minor witness, KS, suggested possible inconsistencies; defense counsel did not inform Bonney of KS’s letter within the 30-day window to seek relief from the plea.
Bonney moved for post-conviction relief in Wyoming; the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and admitted KS’s affidavit/testimony but found no prejudice from counsel’s failure to disclose the letter.
The Wyoming trial court reasoned that withdrawal of the plea would have been risky and could have exposed the defense to additional charges and undermined the conspiracy defense; it concluded counsel’s performance was likely deficient but not prejudicial.
Wyoming Supreme Court denied review; Bonney then sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which the district court granted in part by issuing a conditional writ, relying on Flores-Ortega to conclude Bonney was prejudiced in not appealing.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding the state court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under AEDPA.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
AEDPA standard applied?	Bonney argues the district court correctly applied AEDPA; the Wyoming court’s decision was unreasonable under § 2254(d)(1).	Wyoming Defendants contend the state court reasonably applied Strickland and did not unreasonably apply precedents.	No; the state court’s decision was not unreasonable under AEDPA.
Does Flores-Ortega govern prejudice in a trial-claim context?	Flores-Ortega requires prejudice if counsel’s deficient performance deprived Bonney of an appeal he would have taken.	Flores-Ortega concerns appeals, not trial-based pleas; prejudice here is governed by Strickland’s prejudice standard applied to plea withdrawal.	Flores-Ortega does not clearly apply; the state court reasonably applied the standard similar to Hill/Strickland for plea withdrawals.
Did the state court reasonably apply Strickland’s prejudice standard?	There was a reasonable probability that Bonney would have pursued withdrawal or appeal if informed of KS’s letter.	The state court reasonably found no reasonable probability that withdrawal or appeal would have occurred to undermine the outcome.	Yes; the state court reasonably applied Strickland’s prejudice standard.
Was the district court correct to rely on Flores-Ortega as controlling prejudice?	Bonney maintained Flores-Ortega controls and requires prejudice by depriving him of an appeal; the district court erred.	Flores-Ortega does not control trial-based pleas; prejudice must be assessed under Strickland/Hill in context.	District court erred in treating Flores-Ortega as controlling; state court’s approach was reasonable.
Was the Wyoming state court’s decision contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent?	Bonney asserts the decision was contrary or unreasonable under AEDPA due to misapplied prejudice standards.	Wyoming’s decision reasonably applied governing precedents to the facts.	No; the state court’s decision was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law.

Key Cases Cited

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011) (AEDPA deference—unreasonable applications require objective justification)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (defines 'clearly established' for AEDPA review)
Flores-Ortega v. United States, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) (prejudice framework for failure to file an appeal)
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (prejudice standard requires rational decision on plea rejection)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong deficient performance and reasonable probability prejudice)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (applies Strickland to guilty-plea challenges)
Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007) (AEDPA standard is highly deferential)
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) (defendant retains control over fundamental decisions)