Bonner v. the State, 339 Ga. App. 539

Keshaun Bonner was indicted in Fulton County for armed robbery, motor vehicle hijacking, and possession of a firearm during a felony arising from an April 3, 2014 alleged car taking.
Clayton County later charged Bonner with felony theft by receiving (retaining) the same car; Bonner pled guilty in Clayton County on December 8, 2014 while Fulton charges remained pending.
At the Clayton plea hearing prosecutor recited a factual basis that Bonner possessed a stolen car that belonged to another and that he knew or should have known it was stolen.
Bonner moved in Fulton County to dismiss under plea in bar, arguing collateral estoppel/double jeopardy barred prosecution for taking (armed robbery/hijacking) because his theft-by-receiving conviction necessarily found someone else stole the car.
The Fulton trial court denied the plea, reasoning Bonner had not yet been convicted of two mutually exclusive crimes and suggesting the receiving conviction could be set aside before trial.
The Court of Appeals reviewed de novo and reversed, holding the theft-by-retaining conviction necessarily found another person stole the car and therefore barred prosecution for armed robbery and hijacking (and attendant firearm count) because those offenses require a finding that Bonner actually took the car.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Bonner's prior guilty plea to theft by receiving (retaining) collateral estops prosecution for armed robbery and hijacking of the same car	Bonner: his receiving conviction necessarily determined someone else stole the car, so collateral estoppel (Fifth Amendment double jeopardy) bars prosecution for taking/hijacking	State: Fulton prosecution may proceed; trial court suggested receiving conviction could be set aside and State also raised (but waived) evidentiary objections to proving prior judgment	Court: Conviction for theft by receiving/retaining contains an implicit finding that someone other than defendant stole the goods, so prosecution for armed robbery and hijacking (which require actual taking) is barred; plea in bar should have been granted

Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (collateral estoppel as a component of double jeopardy)
Malloy v. State, 293 Ga. 350 (Ga. 2013) (explains collateral estoppel in subsequent criminal prosecutions)
Thomas v. State, 261 Ga. 854 (Ga. 1992) (theft by receiving requires goods stolen by someone other than the accused; cannot convict for both robbery and receiving)
Ingram v. State, 268 Ga. App. 149 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (theft by receiving by retaining is mutually exclusive with armed robbery)
Clark v. State, 144 Ga. App. 69 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (guilty plea to receiving collaterally estopped subsequent burglary prosecution related to same theft)
Smith v. State, 335 Ga. App. 639 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (vacating convictions where receiving and robbery convictions were inconsistent)
Milanovich v. United States, 365 U.S. 551 (U.S. 1961) (reasoning that taking and receiving of same goods are part of one continuous transaction)