Bonner v. Delp
180 N.E.3d 11
Ohio Ct. App.2021Background
- Evelyn Delp created the Delp Independence Trust (1999) for beneficiaries Brad and Cleves; attorney Dominic Spinazze was initial trustee and resigned effective February 22, 2010; Roberta Bonner was appointed successor trustee on February 23, 2010.
- Trust corpus included two LPL brokerage accounts (total ≈ $525k) and 0.125 Class A voting shares (2%) of The Delp Company (TDC). Bonner later alleged transfers of the LPL accounts and TDC voting stock to Cleves or his trusts without proper authority.
- Bonner sued Spinazze (as former trustee) and Cleves (individually, as trust advisor, and as trustee of another trust) asserting breach of fiduciary duty/trust, fraud, conversion, constructive trust, promissory estoppel, conspiracy, and breach of contract. Spinazze moved for summary judgment; the court granted it (April 25, 2016). Claims against Cleves proceeded to bench trial (July 2018).
- At trial the court found evidence that Bonner had accepted trusteeship and acted as trustee in 2010 (opened Schwab account, signed checks, executed promissory notes borrowing $400k on July 1, 2010 to pay life‑insurance premiums), and that Brad knew of the LPL transfer by July 13, 2010 (recorded call) and had signed consent to the TDC share transfer.
- Trial court held Bonner’s claims against Cleves time‑barred (fraud claims should have been discovered no later than July 1, 2010) and that res judicata barred claims about the TDC shares because Brad had litigated the matter in federal court; this court affirmed both the April 25, 2016 and August 5, 2020 judgments.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Were claims against former trustee Spinazze time‑barred under the Trust Code repose? | Bonner: Spinazze continued duties after resignation and did not deliver trust property, so repose did not run; disputed resignation activity creates factual issue. | Spinazze: resigned Feb 22, 2010; repose began then; actions pre‑date repose cutoff. | Court: Spinazze resigned effective Feb 22, 2010; later trial evidence showed Bonner acted as trustee in 2010, so claims were untimely. |
| Does R.C. 5807.07 (duties continue until property delivered) toll the four‑year repose? | Bonner: Yes — because trust property wasn't delivered, trustee retained duties and limitations did not run. | Spinazze: No applicable toll; repose triggered by resignation; plaintiff’s summary‑judgment averments proven false at trial. | Court: Even if tolling applied, trial evidence showed trustee duties had effectively transferred to Bonner in 2010; claims still untimely. |
| Are fraud claims against Cleves timely under the discovery rule and is Brad's knowledge imputable to Bonner? | Bonner: She did not discover transfers until 2012–2014; Brad’s knowledge is not imputable; defendants concealed transfers. | Cleves: Brad was de facto trustee whose knowledge is imputable; Bonner knew or should have known by July 1, 2010 (borrowed funds to pay premiums). | Court: Bonner knew or should have known by July 1, 2010 (duty to inquire); claims barred by the four‑year statute. |
| Does res judicata bar Bonner’s claims concerning the TDC voting stock because of the prior federal case? | Bonner: Parties and claims differ; probate trust administration claims belong in state court. | Cleves: Brad and Bonner were in privity; federal suit sought return of TDC shares and could have included the same claims/relief. | Court: Found privity and that both suits arose from the same transaction and sought same relief; res judicata bars the TDC claims. |
Key Cases Cited
- Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102 (1996) (de novo appellate review standard for summary judgment)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary‑judgment standard regarding genuine issue of material fact)
- Cundall v. U.S. Bank, 122 Ohio St.3d 188 (2009) (discovery rule: accrual when plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered fraud)
- Continental Ins. Co. v. Whittington, 71 Ohio St.3d 150 (1994) (trial development can render earlier summary‑judgment denial harmless; post‑trial evidence may justify affirming judgment)
- Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328 (2012) (manifest‑weight standard for bench‑trial review)
- Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 64 (1978) (elements for granting summary judgment under Civ.R. 56)
- Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280 (1996) (party moving for summary judgment must support motion; nonmoving party must present specific facts)