Bondi v. Vanderstok, 23-852

Background

Congress enacted the Gun Control Act (GCA) in 1968 and defines “firearm” in §921(a)(3) to include (A) any weapon (including a starter gun) that will, is designed to, or may readily be converted to expel a projectile; and (B) the frame or receiver of any such weapon.
Technological changes produced commercial “weapon parts kits” and partially complete frames/receivers (e.g., Polymer80’s “Buy Build Shoot” kit) that can be assembled into working guns in short order, increasing sales and law‑enforcement concerns about so‑called “ghost guns.”
In 2022 ATF promulgated a rule: 27 C.F.R. §478.11 (treating weapon parts kits designed or that may readily be completed as “firearms”) and §478.12(c) (treating partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frames/receivers that are designed or may readily be completed as “frames or receivers”).
Manufacturers and others brought a pre‑enforcement facial APA challenge; the District Court vacated the rule and the Fifth Circuit largely affirmed, holding that (A) weapon parts kits categorically fall outside §921(a)(3)(A) and (B) subsection (B) reaches only finished frames/receivers.
The Supreme Court reversed. It held the ATF rule is not facially inconsistent with the GCA because (1) some weapon parts kits (e.g., Polymer80’s kit) are “weapons” that may “readily be converted,” and (2) the words “frame” and “receiver” can reach some partially complete items; it rejected plaintiffs’ lenity/avoidance arguments and NFA‑consequence fears as unpersuasive.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument (ATF/Government)	Held
Whether §478.11 (weapon parts kits) is facially invalid under §921(a)(3)(A)	Kits are not “weapons” or otherwise outside subsection (A); Congress did not define ‘‘weapon’’ to include kits	Some kits are artifacts whose intended function is clear and can be ‘‘readily converted’’ (time, tools, expertise comparable to starter guns), so subsection (A) reaches at least some kits	Not facially invalid: at least some kits (e.g., Polymer80’s) qualify as weapons that may readily be converted, so rule survives a facial attack
Whether §478.12(c) (partially complete frames/receivers) is facially invalid under §921(a)(3)(B)	Subsection (B) covers only finished frames/receivers; unfinished items are not ‘‘frames or receivers’’	‘‘Frame’’ and ‘‘receiver’’ are artifact nouns and, in context (and consistent ATF practice), can include some unfinished items that are readily completed	Not facially invalid: statute authorizes ATF to regulate at least some partially complete frames/receivers (e.g., items finished with minutes and common tools)
Do textual differences between subsections (A) and (B) or cross‑statutory (NFA) consequences bar ATF’s reading?	The omission of ‘‘readily be converted’’ in (B) and potential NFA ripple effects (e.g., AR‑15) show Congress did not intend to reach unfinished parts	(B) refers back to ‘‘any such weapon’’ in (A); context and serialization provisions (§923(i)) show (B) can reach unconventional or unfinished frames; government disavows treating AR‑15 receivers as machinegun receivers under the NFA	Plaintiffs’ linguistic and NFA‑consequence arguments unpersuasive; Government’s representations and statutory context limit the feared NFA result
Whether the rule of lenity or constitutional avoidance requires narrowing	Ambiguities with criminal statutes and serious penalties require lenity or avoidance	Text, context, and structure resolve the question for at least some kits/frames; doctrines unnecessary	Doctrines not applied—text/context/structure suffice to reach result for challenged facial claim

Key Cases Cited

VanDerStok v. Garland, 86 F.4th 179 (5th Cir. 2023) (lower‑court decision invalidating ATF rule on facial grounds)
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (standard for successful facial challenge to a statute)
Thompson/Center Arms Co. v. United States, 504 U.S. 505 (1992) (rule of lenity and ambiguity in statutes regulating firearms/parts)
Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169 (2014) (statutory purpose of the GCA to keep guns out of criminals’ hands)
United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d 750 (8th Cir. 2006) (starter‑gun conversion to live fire can take less than an hour)
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (contextual interpretation of statutory terms and administrative definitions)
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995) (presumption of consistent usage within a statute)
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024) (consideration of agency contemporaneous views in statutory interpretation)